Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal
Volume 29
Issue 2 The Tenth Annual Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal Symposium
2013

Don't Rely on Plain Meaning, Trust Your Intuition: Trustees Are Not
"Individuals" Eligible to Recover Punitive Damages Under § 362(k)
Kelly Gould

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj

Recommended Citation
Kelly Gould, Don't Rely on Plain Meaning, Trust Your Intuition: Trustees Are Not "Individuals" Eligible to
Recover Punitive Damages Under § 362(k), 29 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 465 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj/vol29/iss2/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

GOULD GALLEYS3

6/27/2013 2:17 PM

DON’T RELY ON PLAIN MEANING, TRUST YOUR
INTUITION: TRUSTEES ARE NOT “INDIVIDUALS”
ELIGIBLE TO RECOVER PUNITIVE DAMAGES
UNDER § 362(K)
ABSTRACT
To help debtors obtain a fresh start post-bankruptcy, § 362(a) of the Code
provides for an automatic stay, which enjoins creditors from taking any
collection action against a debtor immediately upon the debtor’s filing for
bankruptcy. Originally, victims of a stay violation relied solely on the
bankruptcy court’s contempt power to recover damages. In 1984, Congress
added a new subsection to § 362, now codified as § 362(k), to specifically
authorize bankruptcy courts to award damages to an “individual injured” by a
violation of the stay. Most importantly, § 362(k) permits bankruptcy courts to
award punitive damages, which typically are not an available remedy for civil
contempt.
The circuit courts are split on whether a trustee may be considered an
“individual injured” under § 362(k). The Third and Fourth Circuits hold that
non-natural persons like trustees cannot recover damages under § 362(k),
whereas the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that they can. Because the
Code’s commercial and remedial provisions affect society in pervasive ways,
the importance of a consistent interpretation of the Code should not be
underestimated.
Since punitive damages are only available under § 362(k), whether a trustee
is considered an “individual” for the purposes of this statute can significantly
affect his total damage award. Similarly, the issue of whether a party is an
“individual” arises when other parties, such as chapter 11 debtors or nonviolating creditors that are corporations or other business entities, seek to
remedy a violation of the stay.
Utilizing the Supreme Court’s established method of interpreting the Code,
this Comment first argues that the term “individual” under § 362(k) should
only include entities that are (1) natural persons and (2) injured by the violation
of the stay. Because a trustee is not a natural person, but a representative of the
bankruptcy estate, and is not personally injured by a violation of the stay,
§ 362(k) should not protect the trustee.
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Next, this Comment applies a law-and-economics perspective to argue that
awarding punitive damages to a trustee runs contrary to the policy rationale
behind punitive damages. Thus, to be in accordance with congressional intent,
a trustee should not be considered an “individual” under § 362(k) and should
instead have to rely on the contempt remedy to receive damages for a violation
of the stay.
INTRODUCTION
The stay provision in § 362(a) of the Code1 is a fundamental protection
designed to offer debtors the “breathing spell” they need from creditors to be
able to obtain a “fresh start” after bankruptcy.2 The automatic stay, which takes
effect upon a debtor’s filing for bankruptcy, penalizes creditors who take any
action against the debtor’s property without the court’s approval.3 Despite the
automatic stay’s protection, however, bankruptcy courts are filled with
heartbreaking stories of debtors whose lives were upended by creditors who
willfully violated the stay by seizing debtors’ homes and cars,4 shutting off
debtors’ utilities,5 and even repossessing debtors’ personal belongings6 to
collect outstanding debts.
One such story is of Robert and Cindy Baker, chapter 7 debtors whose
outstanding debt included a purchase-money loan for household furniture.7
Even after receiving notice of the Bakers’ filing, the creditor attempted to
repossess the furniture to satisfy a small, unpaid loan, thereby violating the
automatic stay.8 This creditor also violated the automatic stay in another
bankruptcy proceeding by trying to repossess other debtors’ furniture.9 The
bankruptcy judge noted that the debtor in the other bankruptcy proceeding was
1

11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
H.R. REP NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97 (“The automatic
stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a
breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions.”).
3 See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012).
4 Smith v. Homes Today, Inc. (In re Smith), 296 B.R. 46, 52 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2003) (creditor
repossessed a debtor’s mobile home while debtor was physically inside it, requiring her to jump from the
moving home to the ground).
5 See, e.g., Aponte v. Aungst (In re Aponte), 82 B.R. 738, 745 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (landlord
repeatedly turned off the heat and hot water to the apartment rented by the tenant-debtor, even though the
landlord knew of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing).
6 In re Baker, 183 B.R. 30, 31 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1995).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 32.
2
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in tears at the prospect of losing her furniture.10 While the judge found no
actual loss and no basis for compensatory damages, he nevertheless instructed
the creditor to pay punitive damages to deter future violations.11
Awarding punitive damages to debtors like those in In re Baker is
intuitively appropriate because debtors rely on the automatic stay to offer
guidance in times of extreme financial difficulty, to ensure that their property
will be protected, and to provide relief in case their property is not protected.12
Yet, sophisticated creditors take advantage of a debtor’s vulnerability and lack
of familiarity with the bankruptcy rules and proceedings, sometimes
maliciously and repeatedly.13 The bankruptcy court’s position reflects this
intuition. In awarding punitive damages, courts have taken into account the
effect of any such repossession of property on a debtor and his family,14 the
motive of the repossessing creditor, and the relation between the debtor and the
creditor.15
While punitive damages may be appropriate for individual debtors in some
circumstances, the debtor is not always the one to pursue a case against a
creditor for violating the automatic stay. As a representative of the bankruptcy
estate, a chapter 7 trustee also has standing to seek a remedy for a violation of
the automatic stay.16 However, cases brought by trustees contrast starkly with
those brought by individual debtors because a trustee’s case lacks the human
element that characterizes cases like In re Baker. Unlike the debtor, the trustee
does not suffer from bankruptcy and is simply doing his job to liquidate the
debtor’s property and distribute the proceeds to creditors as efficiently as
possible.17
Furthermore, a trustee likely would not represent the estate against a
creditor in a case like In re Baker in which the violation of the stay involved
personal property or property with nominal value. In In re Baker, the furniture
10

Id. at 32 n.4.
Id. at 33.
12 See COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.03[1] (“[The stay] provides immediate relief for debtors in financial
difficulty and . . . protects individual debtors’ exemption rights, and their ability to avoid liens on exempt
property and redeem exempt personal property, by preventing creditors from seizing or selling the property at
issue.”).
13 See, e.g., In re Baker, 183 B.R. at 32; Aponte v. Aungst (In re Aponte), 82 B.R. 738, 743, 745–46
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
14 See, e.g., In re Aponte, 82 B.R. at 745.
15 Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. A.M. Pugh Assocs., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 85, 99 (M.D. Pa. 1984)).
16 11 U.S.C. § 323 (2006).
17 See id. § 704(a) (outlining the duties of the trustee).
11
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debt likely would have been either exempted from the estate or worth too little
to justify the trustee’s time and expense in asserting the stay.18 Because a
trustee is not permitted to liquidate exempt property—which often includes
homes, cars, and household furniture19—and generally does not liquidate
property that has little value to the estate,20 a trustee does not have an interest
in claiming a violation of the stay regarding such property.21
Automatic stay violations resulting in small monetary damages but large
intangible or emotional harm to the debtor, such as the violation in In re
Baker,22 are precisely the ones that most warrant an award of punitive
damages.23 In such cases, punitive damages are necessary to adequately deter
creditors from violating the stay and punish violating creditors for their
unconscionable actions against vulnerable debtors.24 In most cases brought by
trustees, however, punitive damages are not necessary to accomplish the goals
of deterrence and punishment,25 which are consistently cited as the primary
policy reasons for awarding punitive damages.26 Compensatory damages and
attorneys’ fees are sufficient to reach these ends.27
This Comment argues that Congress did not intend for chapter 7 trustees to
have access to the same options for recovery that are available to individual
debtors. Section 362(k)28 provides an “individual injured” by a violation of the
stay with a specific statutory remedy.29 This section enables an “individual” to
recover compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and even punitive damages.30
18

See In re Baker, 183 B.R. at 31 (claim for $2,200); 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.02[1]–[2].
See, e.g., In re Szekely, 936 F.2d 897, 903 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that the trustee was not entitled to
take possession of debtors’ home, which was partially exempt, until the trustee paid off the homestead
exemption in cash).
20 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.02[1]–[2].
21 In re Preston Lumber Corp., 199 B.R. 415, 416 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) (“This collateral is
encumbered far in excess of its worth. Accordingly, the estate should have no interest in administering these
assets and the trustee would be expected to abandon them.”).
22 See In re Baker, 183 B.R. at 32 n.4.
23 See, e.g., id. at 33.
24 See discussion infra Part III.B.1.b.
25 See discussion infra Part III.B.
26 See Varela v. Ocasio (In re Ocasio), 272 B.R. 815, 823 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002) (“When all is said and
done, a punitive damage award will stand unless it clearly appears that the amount of the award exceeds the
outer boundary of the universe of sums reasonably necessary to punish and deter the defendant’s conduct.”
(quoting Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 81 (1st Cir. 2001))).
27 See discussion infra Part III.B.1.a.
28 Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, the
text now contained in § 362(k) was designated as § 362(h).
29 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006).
30 Id.
19

GOULD GALLEYS3

2013]

6/27/2013 2:17 PM

DON’T RELY ON PLAIN MEANING

469

Prior to the enactment of § 362(k), the contempt remedy under § 105(a)31
provided the only remedial option for those victimized by violations of the
stay.32 However, punitive damages are not available under § 105(a).33 The fact
that Congress specifically used the term “individual” in § 362(k), rather than a
broader term that encompasses both natural and non-natural persons, suggests
that Congress intended to preclude trustees and other non-natural persons from
recovering punitive damages under § 362(k).34
Currently, the circuit courts are split on whether trustees qualify as
individuals for purposes of § 362(k)35—the Ninth Circuit holds that a trustee is
not an individual, while the Third Circuit holds that a trustee is an individual.36
While many circuits have not yet ruled on a trustee’s status, the Second,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that corporate debtors, as nonnatural persons, should not be considered individuals under § 362(k), while the
Fourth Circuit has held the opposite.37 Meanwhile, the district courts and
bankruptcy courts of the undecided circuits have issued conflicting holdings on
these two issues.38
31 Id. § 105(a) (authorizing a bankruptcy court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title”); Burd v. Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665, 669 (4th
Cir. 1989) (concluding that § 105(a)’s plain meaning allows the bankruptcy court to hold a party in civil
contempt).
32 Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 902 F.2d
1098, 1104 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Prior to the enactment [of § 362(k)], . . . the standard that governed the imposition
of sanctions was that which governed contempt proceedings: a party generally would not have sanctions
imposed for its violation of an automatic stay as long as it had acted without maliciousness and had had a good
faith argument and belief that its actions did not violate the stay.”).
33 See also Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d 881, 885
(8th Cir. 1997) (holding that “the power to punish” through punitive sanctions extends beyond the remedial
goals of § 105(a)).
34 See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
35 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[3].
36 Compare Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 192 (9th Cir. 1995), with Cuffee v. Atl. Bus. &
Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990).
37 See, e.g., In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., 108 F.3d at 884; Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng’g,
Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1552–53 (11th Cir. 1996); Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d
613, 619 (9th Cir. 1993); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d
183, 186–87 (2d Cir. 1990). But see Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir.
1986) (holding that “individual” includes a corporation).
38 Compare United States v. Midway Indus. Contractors, Inc. (In re Midway Indus. Contractors, Inc.),
178 B.R. 734, 738 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (corporate debtor is not an individual), Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gallatin State
Bank, 173 B.R. 146, 147 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (corporate debtor is not an individual), Gecker v. Gierczyk (In re
Glenn), 379 B.R. 760, 762–63 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (trustee is not an individual), In re Fashions USA Inc.,
301 B.R. 528, 529–30 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (corporate debtor is not an individual), and McRoberts v.
S.I.V.I. (In re Bequette), 184 B.R. 327, 335 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1995) (corporate debtor is not an individual), with
Martino v. First Nat’l Bank of Harvey (In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc.), 186 B.R. 414, 439 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
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Considering the pervasive nature of bankruptcy law and the importance of
the automatic stay provision in bankruptcy cases,39 it is crucial for the courts to
consistently define who is able to recover under § 362(k).40 Bankruptcy experts
assert that divergent interpretations increase costs, harm bankruptcy law by
preventing the courts from developing a coherent bankruptcy policy and
jurisprudence, and undermine the predictability and stability of the bankruptcy
system.41 Furthermore, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in a dissenting Supreme
Court opinion, highlighted the importance of resolving such issues by aptly
pointing out that every dollar spent litigating an issue is a dollar removed from
a bankruptcy estate that may already be inadequate to satisfy creditors’
claims.42
This Comment argues that a trustee is not an “individual” under § 362(k)
and should therefore be limited to the remedies available under § 105, which
do not include punitive damages. Part I gives a brief background of the
statutory development and legislative history leading up to the 1984
amendment that introduced § 362(k) into the Code, the current Code and its
important automatic stay provision, and an explanation of the current dispute
over who should qualify as an “individual” under § 362(k).
Part II argues that the plain meaning of “individual” does not include a
trustee under principles of statutory interpretation established by the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, Part II argues that, even if a trustee is an “individual,” a
trustee cannot be “injured” for the purposes of § 362(k) and therefore cannot
recover.

(trustee is an individual), and In re A & C Electric Co., 188 B.R. 975, 980 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (corporate
debtor is an individual), aff’d sub nom. Divane v. A & C Electric Co., 193 B.R. 856 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
39 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97 (“The
automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure
actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the
financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy. The automatic stay also provides creditor protection.
Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor’s property. Those
who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors.”).
40 Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Remedies and Damages for Violations of the Automatic Stay Provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.A. § 362(h)), by Parties Other Than the Federal Government, 153 A.L.R. FED.
463 (1999).
41 Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An Empirical Study of the Supreme
Court’s Bankruptcy Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 176–77 (2000).
42 See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 409 (1993) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“An entity in bankruptcy can ill afford to waste resources on litigation; every dollar spent on
lawyers is a dollar creditors will never see.”).
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Part III analyzes the availability of damages for trustees if they are
precluded from recovering under § 362(k). Specifically, this Part uses a lawand-economics approach to argue that punitive damages, which are allowed
under § 362(k), are not an appropriate remedy for trustees. Rather, trustees
have an adequate remedy under the contempt power found in § 105(a).
Part IV engages in a brief discussion on the possible implications for other
players in a stay violation case if trustees are unable to use § 362(k) to recover
damages.
Finally, this Comment concludes by urging courts to rule in accordance
with the plain meaning of and the congressional intent for § 362(k) until the
Supreme Court decides the issue or Congress passes further legislation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of § 362(k), the Damages Provision of the Automatic Stay
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 codified the automatic stay in § 362
of the Code.43 Section 362, as originally enacted under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, did not provide any specific statutory guidance regarding the award of
damages for violation of the stay.44 The courts instead used their contempt
power under § 105 to address automatic stay violations.45 Recovery under
§ 105 is discussed in more detail later in this Comment.46
As a part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Congress introduced a provision that expressly provided for the recovery
of damages by an individual injured by a willful violation of the stay.47 This
new provision, § 362(h), was enacted under a subtitle entitled “Consumer
Credit Amendments,”48 a collection of “consumer amendments intended to
43 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2570–72 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006)).
44 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.LH[4][b] (noting that recovery for willful infringement was added with
the 1984 amendment). Compare Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 101, 92 Stat. at 2570–72, with Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 304, 98 Stat. 333, 352.
45 See Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 902
F.2d 1098, 1104 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Prior to the enactment in 1984 of [§ 362(h), which is now § 362(k)], . . . the
standard that governed the imposition of sanctions [for a violation of an automatic stay] was that which
governed contempt proceedings . . . .”); COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[2].
46 See discussion infra Part I.C.
47 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 § 304, 98 Stat. at 352.
48 See id.

GOULD GALLEYS3

472

6/27/2013 2:17 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

deal with individual bankruptcy”49 and “designed to reduce perceived abuses”
in chapter 7 filings.50
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA) integrated the text of the former § 362(h) into what is now
§ 362(k)(1).51 BAPCPA also added § 362(k)(2), which limits the damages that
may be recovered under subsection (k)(1) to actual damages as long as the
creditor violated the stay under the good faith belief that the stay had been
terminated under § 362(h).52
Section 362(k) states:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), an individual injured by any
willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual
damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate
circumstances, may recover punitive damages.
(2) If such violation is based on an action taken by an entity in the
good faith belief that subsection (h) applies to the debtor, the
recovery under paragraph (1) of this subsection against such entity
53
shall be limited to actual damages.

B. The Automatic Stay and the Trustee’s Role in a Bankruptcy Proceeding
When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, “all legal or equitable interests
of the debtor in property” become property of the bankruptcy estate.54 At the
beginning of a chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the U.S. trustee appoints a
bankruptcy trustee55 to act as the bankruptcy estate’s representative.56 This
49 Sensenich v. Ledyard Nat’l Bank (In re Campbell), 398 B.R. 799, 814 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008) (emphasis
added) (quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.11[3] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2005)).
50 Voelkel v. Naylor (In re Voelkel), 322 B.R. 138, 144 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (citing 6 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 707.04 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed. 2001)).
51 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 305(1)(B),
441(1)(A), 119 Stat. 23, 79, 114 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006)).
52 Id. § 441(1)(B), 119 Stat. at 114 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(2)).
53 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (emphasis added). The Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010 also later
amended § 362, but left § 362(k) unchanged. See Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-327, § 2(a)(12), 124 Stat. 3557, 3558–59.
54 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
55 Id. § 701(a)(1). The U.S. trustee appoints the interim trustee who serves, unless the creditors elect a
trustee. 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 701.01. “Because, in the vast majority of cases, no trustee is elected by
creditors, the interim trustee usually becomes the permanent trustee for the case.” Id.
56 11 U.S.C. § 323(a). This provision must be read together with 28 U.S.C. § 959(a), which states that
“[t]rustees . . . may be sued . . . with respect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business
connected with such property,” and FED. R. BANKR. P. 6009, which states that “the trustee or debtor in
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trustee must do “whatever is necessary to advance [the bankruptcy estate’s]
interests,”57 including accounting for all property received, collecting and
liquidating the estate’s property, investigating the debtor’s financial affairs,
and providing information requested by a party-in-interest.58
A chapter 7 trustee’s primary duty is to bring as much property into the
bankruptcy estate as possible, sell this property, and distribute the proceeds to
unsecured creditors.59 Any property that is not exempt from the estate is
liquidated, and its value is distributed to unsecured creditors under the
direction of the trustee.60
Although the trustee has authority to represent the estate and dispose of the
property that makes up the estate,61 he does so subject to certain limitations.
First, the trustee cannot liquidate property that the debtor has claimed as
exempt, unless the exemption claim is disallowed.62 Second, he usually does
not liquidate property that has no value to the estate, including the debtor’s
personal belongings.63 Lastly, the trustee is strongly discouraged from
liquidating assets that only have nominal value.64
Immediately upon a debtor’s filing for bankruptcy, the automatic stay takes
effect, enjoining creditors from taking any action against the debtor, his

possession may prosecute or may enter an appearance and defend any pending action or proceeding by or
against the debtor, or commence and prosecute any action or proceeding in behalf of the estate before any
tribunal.”
57 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.03.
58 11 U.S.C. § 704(a) (outlining the duties of the trustee in a chapter 7 case). Section 704 does not
directly control the duties of trustees in chapter 11, 12, or 13 cases, but most of a chapter 7 trustee’s duties are
incorporated by reference in chapters 11, 12, and 13. See id. §§ 1106(a)(1), 1202(b)(1), 1302(b)(1). In
addition, a chapter 11 debtor in possession must perform duties similar to many of a chapter 7 trustee’s duties.
See id. § 1107(a).
59 See id. § 704(a)(1).
60 See id. § 507(a) (setting out the distribution priority of unsecured claims).
61 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 323.01.
62 See In re Szekely, 936 F.2d 897, 903 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the trustee was not entitled to take
possession of debtors’ home, which was partially exempt, until debtors received the value of the homestead
exemption in cash). Section 522 allows, in many bankruptcy cases, an individual debtor to “claim exemptions
sufficient to remove all unencumbered property from the bankruptcy estate.” 4 COLLIER, supra note 3,
¶ 522.01 (emphasis added). The types of property that the debtor may typically exempt include the debtor’s
residence, an automobile, household furnishings, and property used in the debtor’s trade or business. 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d).
63 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.02[1]; see also Noland v. Williamson (In re Williamson), 94 B.R. 958,
963 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Landreneau, 74 B.R. 12, 13 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1987).
64 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.02[1]; see also In re Preston Lumber Corp., 199 B.R. 415, 416 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 1996).
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property, and the bankruptcy estate’s exempt and non-exempt property.65 A
creditor violates the stay if it attempts to enforce a lien against property,
repossess property, harass the debtor, or obtain payment from the debtor.66 A
creditor may, however, seek relief from the automatic stay to pursue its
remedies.67 Otherwise, any intentional act that violates the stay is “willful,”
regardless of whether the creditor had malice or specific intent to violate the
stay.68 If a creditor violates the stay, § 362(k)(1) allows an individual injured
by a willful violation of the stay to recover damages, including punitive
damages, from the violating creditor.69
Although any unresolved rights of action arising from the contracts or
property of the debtor pass to the trustee, including a cause of action for a
violation of the automatic stay,70 the trustee should not “bring suit[s] for a
small recovery that would not prove to be of net benefit to the estate.”71 “The
court will respect the trustee’s business judgment in deciding that it is not
worth pursuing assets that are limited or difficult to collect.”72 Because the
trustee represents the estate rather than himself or the debtor in any such case,
any award of damages adds to the property of the estate73 and is thus available
for distribution to creditors.74
The automatic stay has two primary purposes.75 First, by stopping “all
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions,” “[i]t gives the
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors.” 76 This respite enables the debtor
to resolve his debts through repayment, liquidation, or reorganization.77 At the

65

See 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE ¶ 38.02[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,

2012).
66

1 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 1.05[1].
See COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.07 [1].
68 Id. ¶ 362.12[3].
69 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006).
70 Section 323(b) provides the trustee “with the authority and discretion to prosecute, defend or settle, if
appropriate in its judgment, causes of action that existed at the time the order for relief was entered.” COLLIER,
supra note 3, ¶ 323.01; see also 11 U.S.C. § 323(b).
71 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.03.
72 Id.; see also Frostbaum v. Ochs, 277 B.R. 470, 475 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
73 See Ellis v. Emery (In re Upland Partners), 93 F. App’x 166, 168 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he sanction was
for the benefit of the estate . . . .”).
74 See supra text accompanying note 60 (“Any property that is not exempt from the estate is liquidated,
and its value is distributed to unsecured creditors under the direction of the trustee.”); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 507(a) (setting out the distribution priority of unsecured claims).
75 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97.
76 Id.
77 See id.
67

GOULD GALLEYS3

2013]

6/27/2013 2:17 PM

DON’T RELY ON PLAIN MEANING

475

same time, it protects property that may be necessary for the debtor to have a
fresh start.78 Second, the stay protects creditors by preserving the estate and
ensuring “an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated
equally.”79 In this way, the automatic stay protects the trustee’s ability to
control the liquidation of the property of the estate that he represents.
C. Violating the Automatic Stay as Contempt of Court
Prior to the introduction of what is now codified as § 362(k), courts used
their contempt power under § 105 to punish violations of the stay.80 A
violation of the automatic stay constitutes contempt of court because the
automatic stay is a specific and definite court order.81
Section 105 grants courts independent statutory powers to award
compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees for contempt of court to the extent
that such awards are “necessary or appropriate” to carry out the provisions of
the Code.82 Section 105(a) states:83
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of
this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest
shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any
action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of
84
process.

The remedies available under § 362(k) differ from the remedies under § 105(a)
in three ways.

78

See id.; COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.03.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297; COLLIER, supra note 3,
¶ 362.03; see also Martino v. First Nat’l Bank of Harvey (In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc.), 186 B.R. 414,
435 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
80 See Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 902
F.2d 1098, 1104 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Prior to the enactment [of § 362(k)], . . . the standard that governed the
imposition of sanctions was that which governed contempt proceedings: a party generally would not have
sanctions imposed for its violation of an automatic stay as long as it had acted without maliciousness and had
had a good faith argument and belief that its actions did not violate the stay.”).
81 See Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1996).
82 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
83 Id.
84 Id.
79
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First, damages for a willful violation of the stay are mandatory under
§ 362(k), whereas they are discretionary under § 105(a).85 The Ninth Circuit in
In re Goodman noted this to be the primary difference between § 362(k)
damages and § 105(a) civil contempt damages.86
Second, under § 362(k), a court can use its discretion in awarding punitive
damages for a stay violation, whereas punitive damages are not available under
the civil contempt remedies of § 105(a).87 The contempt authority conferred on
bankruptcy courts pursuant to § 105(a) is a civil authority, thus allowing only
sanctions associated with civil contempt.88 In this regard, the language of
§ 105(a) does not explicitly grant the authority to award punitive damages.
Rather, the language authorizes only those remedies “necessary” to enforce the
Code.89 The sanctions associated with civil contempt—compensatory damages,
attorneys’ fees, and the offending creditor’s compliance with the automatic
stay—meet that goal, rendering punitive sanctions unnecessary.90
Third, the procedural requirements of civil contempt under § 105(a),
including the standard of proof, are tougher than those of § 362(k).91 To
recover under § 105(a), a party must prove that the creditor knew of the stay
and intentionally committed the act in violation of the stay.92 Section 362(k)
85 See Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1995); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v.
LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990); Wagner v. Ivory (In re Wagner),
74 B.R. 898, 902–03 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
86 Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 1993).
87 See COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12; see also Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d
1539, 1559 (11th Cir. 1996); Henkel v. Lickman (In re Lickman), 297 B.R. 162, 195 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003)
(“Section 105(a), on the other hand, provides no authority for the imposition of punitive damages for
violations of the automatic stay.” (citing In re Jove Eng’g, Inc., 92 F.3d at 1559)).
88 Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003).
89 Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Sosne v. Reinert &
Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d 881, 885 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that Congress
did not expressly grant “the power to punish” through punitive sanctions under § 105(a)).
90 Walls, 276 F.3d at 507.
91 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[3] (“[T]he imposition of a remedy under a civil contempt procedure
may be subject to a stricter standard than is imposed by section 362(k) and does not afford the availability of
punitive, in addition to compensatory, damages.”); but see id. (“[A]lthough the standards and procedures for
contempt may be slightly more demanding, courts have had little difficulty dealing with and punishing stay
violations even without the availability of section 362(k). There is little reason to adopt a tortured reading of
the statute in order to provide corporate or partnership debtors or trustees with a remedy for stay violations.”
(footnote omitted)).
92 Stockschlaeder & McDonald, Esqs. v. Kittay (In re Stockbridge Funding Corp.), 145 B.R. 797, 805
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (setting forth two requirements for finding civil contempt as being: (1) creditor must
have knowledge of specific, precise order of bankruptcy court; and (2) creditor must knowingly violate that
order of bankruptcy court), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 158 B.R. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). These requirements
are the same in the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v.
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does not require any showing of specific intent to violate the stay.93 In contrast,
to recover under § 105(a), a party must prove that the creditor who violated the
automatic stay had a “malicious intent or lack of good faith,” a much tougher
standard than under § 362(k).94
II. INTERPRETATION OF § 362(K)
For a trustee or any other entity to recover damages under § 362(k), the
party must fall within § 362(k)’s meaning of “individual injured.”95
That is, any party eligible to recover under the statute must satisfy two
criteria: the party must not only be an “individual,” but also be “injured.” The
definitional scope for each of these terms is addressed below.
A. “Individual” as Used in § 362(k) Includes Only Natural Persons
The first determination is what Congress’ intended definition of
“individual” is. The Supreme Court has not specifically interpreted
“individual” in the context of § 362(k), but its approach to statutory
interpretation suggests that the term includes only natural persons. A trustee, in
his capacity as the representative of the estate, is not a natural person. Thus, a
trustee is not an individual for the purposes of the statute.
Although some courts addressing this issue have only focused on the term
“individual,”96 the term “injured” is equally important. Even if a trustee is an
individual, he cannot recover damages under § 362(k) if he is not also injured.
Few courts have dealt directly with the issue of whether a trustee is an
individual under § 362(k).97 Because the Code does not define “individual,”

Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 902 F.2d 1098, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990); Cuffee v. Atl.
Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990); Budget Serv. Co.
v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 293 (4th Cir. 1986); Putnam v. Rymes Heating Oils, Inc. (In re
Putnam), 167 B.R. 737, 740 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (citing Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman),
991 F.2d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 1993)).
93 Galmore v. Dykstra (In re Galmore), 390 B.R. 901, 907 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008) (citing Price v.
United States (In re Price), 42 F.3d 1068, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994)); Surette, supra note 40, § 2[a] (“The
willfulness element [of the automatic stay] goes to the deliberateness of the act that violated the stay, and not
to a specific intent to violate the automatic stay.”).
94 Shadduck v. Rodolakis, 221 B.R. 573, 580 (D. Mass. 1998).
95 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2006).
96 See Surette, supra note 40, § 2[a].
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courts interpreting § 362(k) have had considerable trouble determining whom
Congress intended to include within the scope of this provision and are split as
to its meaning.98 Currently, the majority interprets “individual” to include a
trustee, while a minority holds that a trustee is not an individual because the
term only includes natural persons. However, a greater number of courts have
addressed the analogous issue of whether a corporation is an individual under
§ 362(k).99
Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the meaning of
“individual” as used in the Code, the Court has tangentially addressed the term
while interpreting other parts of the Code100 and has determined the meaning
of “individual” in contexts outside of bankruptcy law.101
1. Statutory Interpretation Using Supreme Court Precedent
Determining whether a trustee is an “individual” within the meaning of
§ 362(k) is a question of statutory interpretation to be answered in accordance
with principles that the Supreme Court has applied when interpreting the Code.
The Court’s textual approach to statutory interpretation requires an
examination of the plain meaning of “individual.”

97 See Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 192 (9th Cir. 1995) (“There is no controlling
authority from this or any other circuit that answer the question [of whether a trustee is an individual under
§ 362(k)].”).
98 The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that non-natural persons, specifically trustees or
corporations, are not individuals. See Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003);
Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1997)
(corporate debtor); Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir.
1996) (trustee); In re Pace, 67 F.3d at 193 (trustee); Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991
F.2d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 1993) (corporate debtor); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re
Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186–87 (2d Cir. 1990) (corporate debtor). However, the Third Circuit holds
that a trustee is an individual. Cuffee v. Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901
F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990).
99 See generally David Swarthout, Note, When Is an Individual a Corporation?—When the Court
Misinterprets a Statute, That’s When!, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 151 (2000).
100 The Supreme Court tangentially addressed the meaning of “individual” in Toibb v. Radloff when it
interpreted the term “person.” Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 160–61 (1991). The Court concluded that the
petitioner could be a chapter 11 debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) because the Code defines “person” as used in
title 11 to include an “individual” and § 109(d) does not expressly preclude an “individual” from filing under
chapter 11. Id.
101 Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 607 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (interpreting the meaning of “individual” in
the Torture Victim Protection Act), aff’d sub nom. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012); see
also In re North, 12 F.3d 252, 254–55 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (interpreting the meaning of “individual”
in the Ethics in Government Act using the ordinary approach and finding that “individual” describes a “natural
person”).
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Beginning with its decision in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,
the Supreme Court has applied a “plain meaning” approach to answer
questions of statutory interpretation arising under the Code.102 In Ron Pair, the
Court held that any analysis of the Code must start “where all such inquiries
must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”103
Although the limits of what resources should be considered when
determining the plain meaning of a term are unresolved,104 a purely textual
analysis of a term’s plain meaning likely considers only the following: (1) the
text of the statute itself; (2) statutory definitions of the term; (3) definitions
from relevant dictionaries; and (4) how other sections of the same statute use
the term.105 If the plain meaning of the statute is unambiguous after such an
inquiry, then “the inquiry should end” at that point because “the sole function
of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to its terms.”106
In determining an undefined term’s plain meaning, the Court has
established that a court must first examine the text of the statute itself, paying
close attention to the statute’s word choice107 and grammatical structure.108
Section 362(k)(1) states, “[A]n individual injured by any willful violation of a
stay . . . shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees.”109
The following two maxims of statutory interpretation should guide the analysis
at this stage: (1) the statute “must give effect to every word of a statute
wherever possible”;110 and (2) because Congress carefully selects every word
in a statute, if Congress intended to convey a particular purpose or result, it
would have explicitly done so.111
102 See generally Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2011); Hamilton v. Lanning, 130
S. Ct. 2464, 2471 (2010); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 757–59 (1992); United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
103 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241.
104 See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 41, at 189. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); William D. Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and
Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991).
105 Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 41, at 189.
106 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
107 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724 (“[A court] must give effect to every word of a statute wherever possible.”
(quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 (2004))).
108 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241 (examining the placement of commas in the statute).
109 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
110 See Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724 (quoting Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12).
111 See id. (citing Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gallatin State Bank, 173 B.R. 146, 147–
48 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
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For example, in Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., the Court applied
these two maxims when it interpreted the meaning of “applicable” to determine
the debtor’s projected “disposable income” in a chapter 13 case.112 First, the
Court reasoned, “If Congress had not wanted to separate in this way debtors
who qualify for an allowance from those who do not, it could have omitted the
term ‘applicable’ altogether.”113 Second, the deliberate use of the word
“applicable” led the Court to conclude that “Congress presumably included
[the term] to achieve a different result.”114 The Court’s Ransom opinion
demonstrates the type of analysis that should be used to interpret § 362(k).
With respect to the first maxim, one must assume that Congress used the
word “individual,” instead of the broader term “entity,” in a deliberate manner.
The terms “individual” and “entity” both appear in § 362(k), as amended.
However, it is important to note that § 101, the definitional section of the
Code, specifically defines “entity” but does not define “individual.” Had
Congress intended to permit parties other than a natural person to recover
under § 362(k), it presumably would have used the term “entity,” which
includes trustees under § 101,115 instead of “individual,” which is not
defined.116 Presumably, Congress recognized the distinction between the two
terms when it used both “entity” and “individual”117 in the amended version of
§ 362(k).118 With respect to the second maxim, if Congress had intended
§ 362(k) to allow trustees, in addition to individual debtors, to recover
damages under § 362(k), it would have used the broader term “entity,” which
explicitly permits such recovery.119

112

Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724–25.
Id. at 724.
114 Id.
115 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (2006) (“The term ‘entity’ includes person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and
United States trustee.” (emphasis added)).
116 See In re Sayeh, 445 B.R. 19, 27 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011).
117 Gecker v. Gierczyk (In re Glenn), 379 B.R. 760, 763–64 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (“The addition of
‘entity’ in such close proximity to ‘individual’ is strong evidence that Congress was aware of the distinction
between the terms and deliberately chose to retain the more narrow term in the new section 362(k)(1).”).
118 Congress used the term “entity” in § 362(k)(2), which BAPCPA added to § 362(k) in 2005, but
Congress did not amend the term “individual” as used in § 362(k)(1). See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 441(1), 119 Stat. 23, 114 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 362(k)(1)–(2)).
119 See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gallatin State Bank, 173 B.R. 146, 147–48 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“If Congress
had intended to make Section 362(h) [include corporations or trustees], it would have done so more clearly.”).
113
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After examining the overall text of the statute itself, a court should next
look to the statutory definitions of the term.120 Any interpretation of the term
“individual” must begin with § 101 of the Code, which defines numerous terms
that the Code uses.121 Unfortunately, § 101 does not explicitly define
“individual.” Thus, in this situation, a court would proceed to consult relevant
external dictionaries for definitions of the terms at issue.122
Although the Supreme Court often consults various dictionaries for the
purposes of statutory interpretation, it has not held one to be more reliable than
the others. The Court has previously consulted the Standard Dictionary,
Webster’s Third International Dictionary, the New Oxford American
Dictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary, and Black’s Law Dictionary to
determine the common dictionary definition of the disputed term.123
According to Webster’s Third International Dictionary, “individual” means
“a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution.”124
Similarly, the New Oxford American Dictionary defines an “individual” to be
“a single human being as distinct from a group, class, or family.”125 An aspect
common to both dictionaries’ definitions is that an individual is a “human
being.” This analysis of the dictionaries’ definitions leads to the conclusion
that the term “individual” only includes natural persons and does not include
non-natural persons and other entities like trustees.
If the plain meaning of the term is still unclear after following these steps, a
court may next consider how the disputed term is used in other sections of the
same statute.126 The term’s usage in other portions of the same statute is
significant because “a word is presumed to have the same meaning in all

120 See Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2011); In re A & C Electric Co., 188 B.R.
975, 980 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Divane v. A & C Electric Co., 193 B.R. 856 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
121 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 101.
122 See In re A & C Electric Co., 188 B.R. at 980 (“Since Congress did not define ‘individual’ in the
Bankruptcy Code, its use of that word can be read according to its common dictionary meaning . . . .”).
123 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724.
124 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1152 (2002).
125 NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 865 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate eds., 2001). Black’s
Law Dictionary only defines the adjective form of “individual,” not the noun form. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 843 (9th ed. 2009).
126 See KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 21 (2008); see also Cohen v. De La
Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220 (1998) (noting that there is a presumption that “equivalent words have equivalent
meaning when repeated in the same statute”); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 n.2 (1992) (“[A] word
is presumed to have the same meaning in all subsections of the same statute.” (quoting Morrison-Knudsen
Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983))).
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subsections of the same statute.”127 Thus, in this case, a complete analysis
requires an examination of how “individual” is used in the parts of § 362 and
the Code that were already enacted when Congress introduced § 362(k).
The use of “individual” in other sections of the Code suggests that the term
does not include a trustee and only includes natural persons. Even though the
Code does not explicitly define “individual,” the term “individual” is used in
other definitions in § 101.128 For example, § 101(15) defines the term “entity”
to include a “person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States
trustee,”129 and § 101(41) defines the term “person” as including an
“individual, partnership, and corporation.”130 Replacing § 101(41)’s definition
of “person” for the word “person” in § 101(15)’s definition of “entity” creates
a clearer and more comprehensive definition of “entity.” After making this
substitution, the definition of “entity” includes an individual, partnership,
corporation, estate, trust, governmental unit, and U.S. trustee.131
Because statutes should be interpreted in such a way as to avoid
superfluity,132 an analysis of the definition of “entity” sheds additional light on
the meaning of “individual” under § 362(k). Since the definition of “entity”
lists the terms “individual,” “trustee,” and “estate” separately, these three terms
should be read as being mutually exclusive to avoid superfluity. As such, an
“individual” cannot encompass a “trustee” or an “estate.”
In addition to the uses of “individual” within § 101, the term “individual” is
used repeatedly throughout the Code,133 the Bankruptcy Rules,134 and the

127 Patterson, 504 U.S. at 758 n.2 (quoting Morrison-Knudsen, 461 U.S. at 633); see also Cohen, 523 U.S.
at 220 (noting that there is a presumption that “equivalent words have equivalent meaning when repeated in
the same statute”). But see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 n.3 (1992) (“[W]e express no opinion as to
whether the words ‘allowed secured claim’ have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.”).
128 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2006).
129 Id. § 101(15).
130 Id. § 101(41).
131 See id. § 101(15), (41).
132 See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2474 (2010) (“[W]e are hesitant to adopt an interpretation
of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law” (quoting
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Conn. Nat’l Bank
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (“Redundancies across statutes are not unusual events in drafting, and so
long as there is no ‘positive repugnancy’ between two laws, a court must give effect to both.” (citations
omitted)).
133 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (defining “consumer debt” as “debt incurred by an individual primarily for a
personal, family, or household purpose”); id. § 101(44) (defining “railroad” as a mode of travel concerned with
transportation of “individuals”); id. § 101(45) (defining “relative” as an “individual related by affinity or
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Official Bankruptcy Forms135 in such a way as to indicate that the intended
meaning of “individual” is a natural person. For example, § 101(18) defines a
“family farmer” as an “individual or individual and spouse engaged in a
farming operation.”136 Of course, only a natural person, not a corporation or a
bankruptcy estate, can have a spouse. Because the term “individual” is used to
apply only to natural persons in this instance, it should be construed in the
same manner throughout the Code.137
After completing this textual analysis, it follows that the plain meaning of
“individual,” as used in § 362(k), includes only natural persons.
2. Is Departing from the Plain Meaning Appropriate?
In Ron Pair, the Supreme Court held that, “as long as the statutory scheme
is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire
beyond the plain language of the statute.”138 The Court explained that the plain
meaning of the statute should be conclusive, except in those “rare cases [in
which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at

consanguinity within the third degree”); id. § 109(e) (providing that only an “individual” with regular income
and such individual’s spouse may become a chapter 13 debtor); id. § 365(d)(5) (stating that trustee will timely
perform all obligations of debtor under unexpired lease of personal property, other than personal property
“leased to an individual primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”); id. § 507(a)(4) (discussing
unsecured claims for “each individual or corporation” and providing that priority is given where “wages,
salaries, or commissions, including vacation, severance, and sick leave pay[, are] earned by an individual”).
134 See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016 (discussing “individuals” under rule entitled “Death or
Incompetency of Debtor”); id. 5002(a) (stating that an “individual [who] is a relative of the bankruptcy judge”
cannot be appointed as trustee); id. 7004(b)(1) (providing service on “an individual other than an infant or
incompetent”).
135 See, e.g., VOLUNTARY PETITION, OFFICIAL FORM 1 (04/10), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Official_2010/B_001_0410.pdf
(distinguishing
between
individual and corporate debtors); INVOLUNTARY PETITION, OFFICIAL FORM 5 (12/07), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_005_1207f.pdf
(distinguishing
between individual and corporate debtors); STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL FORM 7 (04/10),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Official_2010/B_007_
0410.pdf (distinguishing between individual and corporate debtors).
136 11 U.S.C. § 101(18).
137 See Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220 (1998) (noting that there is a presumption that
“equivalent words have equivalent meaning when repeated in the same statute”); Patterson v. Shumate, 504
U.S. 753, 758 n.2 (1992) (“[A] word is presumed to have the same meaning in all subsections of the same
statute.” (quoting Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, 461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983))). But see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 n.3 (1992) (“[W]e express
no opinion as to whether the words ‘allowed secured claim’ have different meaning in other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.”).
138 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989).

GOULD GALLEYS3

484

6/27/2013 2:17 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

odds with the intentions of its drafters.”139 “In such cases, the intention of the
drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”140
The Court has ruled in such a way in other cases to show that “even the
most ardent textualist might compromise his principles of statutory
interpretation” if the policy at stake is overwhelmingly important141 or if using
the strict plain meaning would produce an absurd result.142 On the other hand,
if the plain meaning is not clear, a court should look to the general purpose of
the provision, the policy behind its enactment, subsequent and prior law, and
its legislative history to determine the meaning of the disputed term.143
A textualist would likely conclude that the plain meaning of “individual” in
§ 362(k) is unambiguous and includes only natural persons. Furthermore, this
interpretation does not produce an absurd result and is consistent with both the
rest of the automatic stay provision and the rest of the Code.144 As discussed
later, this interpretation of § 362(k) reflects Congress’s intent for the term
“individual” in § 362(k) to be limited to natural persons.
The plain meaning analysis ends here. A court will continue its analysis
only if the plain meaning is unclear.145 Some lower courts have reasoned that
the plain meaning is unclear because the term “individual” is not expressly

139

Id. at 242 (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571
(1982)).
140 Id.
141 KLEE, supra note 126, at 31; see BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 542–43 (1994). In
interpreting § 548’s use of the phrase “reasonably equivalent value,” Justice Scalia wrote that, “absent clearer
textual guidance than the phrase ‘reasonably equivalent value’—a phrase entirely compatible with pre-existing
practice,” the Court would not depart from real estate mortgage foreclosure practices that had existed for over
400 years. Id.
142 See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (finding
that it is well established that “when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms” (quoting Ron
Pair, 489 U.S. at 241) (internal quotation marks omitted)); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (non-bankruptcy case).
143 See KLEE, supra note 126, at 17. Regardless of whether the plain meaning is clear, recent Supreme
Court decisions have applied a more liberal plain meaning approach than the one endorsed in Ron Pair and
have looked to whether the statute’s purpose and legislative history lend to their interpretation of a term’s
original meaning. See generally Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011); Hamilton v.
Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010). In Ransom, the Court considered whether “BAPCPA’s purpose strengthen[ed
its] reading of the term ‘applicable.’” Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 725.
144 See Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 184 (2d
Cir. 1990).
145 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241.
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defined in the Code.146 Thus, such plain meaning should not be exclusively
relied on to resolve the precise issue under consideration.
Even if the plain meaning of “individual” is supposedly clear, the
interpretational analysis should not necessarily end here because the plain
meaning approach is not always reliable.147 Critics of the plain meaning
approach have long complained that the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Code in an inconsistent manner.148 Indeed, some critics have skeptically
pointed out that the Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence “[a]dopt[s] a ‘plain
meaning’ posture where the language of the statute meets with judicial
approval, and use[s] legislative intent to contradict the language of the statute
where a literal reading is not kind to the desired result.”149
If the meaning of “individual” under § 362(k) were so “plain” that it
“cannot be read in any other way,”150 then this issue would not have split the
circuits. Any split should, at a minimum, cause a reasonable court to reflect on
how the divergent interpretations arose and to examine the validity and
relevance of the reasons supporting the divergent interpretations.151
146 See, e.g., Bohm v. Howard (In re Howard), 428 B.R. 335, 337 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
United Bank, Inc. v. Howard (In re Howard), No. 2:10CV962, 2011 WL 578777 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2011).
147 While the Supreme Court currently endorses the plain meaning approach, the results under this
analysis are inconsistent. Logically, any case of statutory interpretation that goes to the Supreme Court due to a
split in meaning among the circuits suggests that the meaning is unclear. For example, in Hamilton v. Lanning,
the Court used the plain meaning approach to interpret the term “projected” in BAPCPA’s projected
disposable income test. Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2471–72. They concluded that “projected” implied that a
bankruptcy court has discretion to make appropriate adjustments to income where significant changes in a
debtor’s financial circumstances are virtually certain. Id. at 2472. However, the fact that lower circuit courts
reached the opposite conclusion after applying the plain meaning approach when interpreting this term
suggests the test is unreliable. Id. at 2473.
148 See, e.g., Thomas G. Kelch, An Apology for Plain-Meaning Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, 10
BANKR. DEV. J. 289, 301–09 (1994); Kenneth N. Klee & Frank A. Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent:
Eight Years of Judicial Legislation, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1988); Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence
Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 6,
109–10 (1996); Bruce A. Markell, Conspiracy, Literalism, and Ennui at the Supreme Court: An Examination
of Bankruptcy Cases Decided from 1990 to 1993, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 174, 181–82 (1994); Charles Jordan
Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823, 879–85 (1991); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act
in the Supreme Court, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 570–75 (1988).
149 See Klee & Merola, supra note 148, at 2.
150 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242. In Ron Pair, the court determined that the plain meaning of § 506(b) was
clear based on the placement of the commas in the statute. Id. at 241–42. “[T]hat the Congress should or could
contemplate . . . a decisive change in law [regarding this statute according to punctuation is] an entirely
unrealistic view of the precision of . . . congressional drafting . . . .” Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A
Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 887, 897 (2000).
151 See Bussel, supra note 150, at 896–97.
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Consistency is especially important in bankruptcy law because the Code has a
pervasive effect on society. Thus, it may be appropriate to buttress the
statutory interpretation of “individual” by looking to resources beyond the
plain meaning of the text.
3. Expanding Statutory Interpretation Beyond the Plain Meaning
While the Supreme Court in Ron Pair based its ruling on its determination
of the statute’s plain meaning,152 the Court has, in other cases, examined
additional evidence to confirm its interpretation. Here, this Comment
summarizes what other evidence the Court has used at this stage. This
Comment then applies this expanded analysis to argue that “individual” as
used in § 362(k) should be interpreted so as to not include trustees and to only
include natural persons.
The Court notes that, “[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by
a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy.”153 First, to aid its interpretation of a
disputed term’s plain meaning, the Court has often considered how the term is
used in areas outside of the statute.154 For example, in Hamilton v. Lanning, the
Court looked at how the disputed term was used in other legal contexts, such as
other federal statutes.155 Second, the Court has referred to prior law, the
development of the law, and the law’s legislative history in an attempt to glean
Congress’s intent in drafting the statute.156 Lastly, the Court has also looked to
the overall purpose and policy behind the statute to lend additional insight to

152

Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242–43.
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986) (quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S.
207, 222 (1986)); see also Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (“[C]ommon sense
suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information rather than ignoring it.”); Bank of Marin
v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (“[W]e do not read these statutory words with the ease of a computer.
There is an overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction.”);
United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1940) (“When aid to construction of the
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its
use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination.’” (footnotes omitted)).
154 See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2471–72 (2010).
155 Id. at 2472. Furthermore, in interpreting the meaning of the word “projected,” the Court in Hamilton
considered what projections were used in business law, politics, and even sports. Id. at 2471–72.
156 KLEE, supra note 126, at 17 (“Even when the language of the statute is clear, courts must consider the
legislative history and issues of policy and previous practice to determine congressional intent.”). Generally,
when the Code does not supply a definition for a particular statutory term, the court “turn[s] to the legislative
history in an attempt to glean congressional intent.” La. Dep’t of Revenue & Taxation v. Lewis (In re Lewis),
199 F.3d 249, 251–52 (5th Cir. 2000).
153
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its reading of the disputed term.157 An analysis of these types of evidence
demonstrates that the term “individual” under § 362(k) only includes a natural
person.
First, an examination of the use of “individual” in other federal statutes
suggests that “individual” means only a natural person. For example, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted the word
“individual” in the Torture Victim Protection Act to encompass only natural
persons.158 Another federal statute, the Dictionary Act, which provides
guidance in “determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,”159 has directed
courts to presume that the use of “individual” in a statute refers to natural
persons and not corporations or trustees.160
Second, the evolution of the Code and the Code’s legislative history
suggest that the term “individual” means only a natural person. In deciphering
the congressional intent behind the Code, the Court has held that, as a matter of
statutory construction, courts should examine prior law and the development of
the statute because the Code shall not be read so as “to erode past bankruptcy
practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure.”161
For example, in Hamilton, the Court examined bankruptcy practice existing
prior to the enactment of BAPCPA to determine the meaning of a provision
that BAPCPA added.162 Because Congress did not amend the meaning of the
term at issue via BAPCPA, the Court defined the term in accordance with the
interpretation espoused by pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice.163 The Court

157 See Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 725 (2011) (considering “BAPCPA’s purpose to
strengthen [its] reading of the term ‘applicable’”).
158 Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 607 (D.C. Cir. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Mohamad v. Palestinian
Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012); cf. In re North, 12 F.3d 252, 254–55 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (finding that
“individual” as used in the Ethics in Government Act means a natural person based on the term’s ordinary
meaning).
159 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
160 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Mohamad, 634 F.3d at
607. The Dictionary Act defines “person” to include “corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, . . . as well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).
161 Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S.
36, 47 (1986)), superseded by statute, Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104 Stat.
2865, as recognized in Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991); accord, e.g., Cohen v. De La Cruz,
523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998); United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 221
(1996); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 244–45 (1989); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988).
162 See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2472–74 (2010).
163 Id. at 2474.
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concluded that, if Congress intended for the term to have another meaning,
“Congress would have said so expressly” in BAPCPA.164
The evolution of § 362(k) suggests that “individual” does not include
trustees. The split among the circuits on whether “individual” should be
construed to include trustees emerged prior to the enactment of BAPCPA.
Despite this existing uncertainty, BAPCPA’s amendment of the former
§ 362(h) did not change “individual” to a more inclusive and definite term such
as “person” or “entity.”165 Congress failed again to broaden the term when it
subsequently passed the Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, which
corrected drafting errors and other problems with BAPCPA and amended
§ 362.166 Thus, following the Court’s reasoning in Hamilton,167 if Congress
had wanted to broaden the scope and availability of § 362(k) remedies to more
than just natural persons, it would have explicitly done so by correcting the
statute to include a broader term such as entity.
The legislative history of the overall Code is another valuable indicator of
the meaning of “individual.” Even though § 362(k) was not enacted as a part of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the legislative history leading to the
Code’s original enactment is relevant. The Senate Report to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 provides that chapter 11 “is primarily designed for
businesses, although individuals are eligible for relief under the chapter.”168
The Senate Report shows that, even at the Code’s inception, Congress intended
for “corporations” and “individuals” to be mutually exclusive terms.169
Lastly, a complete statutory interpretation of the term “individual” would
include an analysis of the purpose of § 362(k), which requires consideration of
not only the purpose and policy of the overarching section, but also the
purpose of the specific subsection at issue.
In Budget Service Company v. Better Homes of Virginia, Inc., the Fourth
Circuit considered only the overall purpose of the automatic stay, rather than
the specific purpose of § 362(k), when it assessed whether a non-natural person

164

Id.
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§§ 305(1)(B), 441(1)(A), 119 Stat. 23, 79, 114 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1)).
166 See generally Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, 124 Stat. 3557.
167 See supra text accompanying notes 162–64.
168 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5789.
169 See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (citing S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 3, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5789).
165
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is an individual under § 362(k).170 After noting that the purpose of the
automatic stay was to provide all debtors relief from harassment from
creditors, the Fourth Circuit held that it was unlikely that Congress intended
the provision to apply to only individual debtors when the policy behind the
stay was so broad.171 However, the Fourth Circuit’s approach did not take into
account the possibility that the purpose of § 362(k) may have been narrower
than the overall purpose of the automatic stay provision.
Although the overall purpose of § 362 is broad enough to warrant
application to both natural and non-natural persons, the purpose of § 362(k) is
likely much narrower.172 As mentioned earlier in this Comment, § 362(k) was
not originally enacted in 1978 as a part of § 362 and was introduced into § 362
as a part of the Consumer Credit Amendments, a specifically tailored group of
amendments found in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984.173 The Consumer Credit Amendments applied only to natural
persons,174 thus suggesting that “the use of the word ‘individual’ was
intentional, and that Congress was enacting a series of measures meant to
benefit only natural persons.”175 Indeed, several courts ruling that trustees
cannot invoke § 362(k) have used this reasoning to support their
conclusions.176
While the policy behind § 362 calls for a broad application of the provision,
the legislative history and construction of § 362 do not necessarily apply to
subsection (k).177 Rather, “Congress may have viewed natural persons as
particularly vulnerable to violations of the automatic stay” and drafted § 362(k)
to provide a “precise, easily applied, private cause of action to vindicate [their]

170

Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir.1986) (corporate debtor).
Id. (“[I]t seems unlikely that Congress meant to give a remedy only to individual debtors against those
who willfully violate the automatic stay provisions of the Code as opposed to debtors which are corporations
or other like entities. Such a narrow construction of the term would defeat much of the purpose of the
section . . . .”).
172 See Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186 (2d
Cir. 1990).
173 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 304, 98 Stat. 333,
352.
174 “The term ‘consumer debt’ means debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or
household purpose.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2006). Non-natural persons would have no debt for a “personal,
family, or household purpose.” See id.
175 In re Chateaugay Corp., 920 F.2d at 186.
176 See, e.g., id.
177 See id.
171
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rights, consistent with the consumer protection goals of the statute.”178 On the
other hand, Congress may have viewed trustees and other entities, such as
corporations, as “more likely to already know their rights under the bankruptcy
law” because they are repeat players in the system.179
B. Trustee Is Not a Natural Person
Pursuant to the above analysis, the term “individual” as used in § 362(k)
should be interpreted to include only natural persons. A trustee is not a natural
person because the trustee is acting not in his personal capacity, but in his
professional capacity as a representative of a bankruptcy estate, which is not a
natural person. Thus, the trustee should not be considered an “individual”
eligible to recover damages under § 362(k).
Under § 541(a), the commencement of a bankruptcy case “creates an
estate.”180 A trustee is appointed to act as that estate’s representative.181
Section 321(a), which outlines the eligibility requirements to serve as a trustee,
provides that “[a] person may serve as a trustee in a case under this title only if
such person is—(1) an individual that is competent to perform the duties of
trustee . . . ; or (2) a corporation authorized by such corporation’s charter or
bylaws to act as trustee.”182
If an individual assumes the role of a trustee as § 321(a) permits, that
individual is inarguably a natural person in his personal capacity. But, the
personal status of the individual serving as the trustee should have no bearing
on the status of his position as a trustee (i.e., a representative of an estate).183
178 In re Abacus Broad. Corp., 150 B.R. 925, 928 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993). The Court has recognized that
the rehabilitation of debtors is an overarching policy that animates the Code. See, e.g., Cohen v. De La Cruz,
523 U.S. 213, 217 (1998); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S.
151, 160–62 (1991); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244–45 (1934).
179 In re Abacus Broad. Corp., 150 B.R. at 928 (citing In re Chateaugay Corp., 920 F.2d at 186); see also
id. (“Similar protections were evidently not deemed necessary for presumably more sophisticated corporations
capable of fending for themselves.”).
180 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006).
181 Id. § 323(a).
182 Id. § 321(a). At first glance, § 321 could indicate the either/or scenario that, if a trustee is not a
corporation, the trustee must be considered an individual who would be entitled to recover under § 362(k). See
Eric Howe, Note, Benefiting the Bankruptcy System Through Deterrence: Allowing a Chapter 7 Trustee to
Recover Punitive Damages for a Violation of the Automatic Stay Under § 362(h), 90 IOWA L. REV. 1939,
1961–62 (2005). However, upon closer inspection, this provision merely comments on the status of that person
(corporation or individual) prior to becoming a trustee and does not preclude the trustee from being an entity
completely distinct from an individual or a corporation.
183 See 11 U.S.C. § 323(a).
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Serving as the newly created trustee is a professional role filled by the
individual, distinct from that individual’s personal status.184 Whether a trustee
is a natural person should not be determined based on his personal status as an
individual, but on his professional status as a representative of a bankruptcy
estate.185
Section 321 bolsters the idea that the trustee, as the estate’s representative,
should be classified separately from the person (either an individual or a
corporation) who fills the role of the trustee.186 The concurring opinion in In re
Pace pointed out that, if the trustee’s classification as an individual or nonindividual was based on his personal status, then a court could award damages
to a bankruptcy estate represented by a trustee who is an individual, but not to
an identical bankruptcy estate represented by a corporation.187 Because the
Code sets forth identical rights and duties for both corporate and individual
trustees and the estates that they represent, the concurrence noted that “no
logical reason presents itself why Congress would require [this result].”188
The distinction between the trustee as the estate’s representative and the
natural person who fills the role of trustee is further emphasized by the fact
that a violation of an automatic stay damages the estate’s property, not the
trustee’s personal property.189 If the trustee were acting in his personal
capacity, he would have no cause to assert a violation of the automatic stay
because it is the debtor, not the trustee, who has filed for bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy courts do not award damages resulting from automatic stay
violations to the trustee himself, but to the estate.190
Based on his professional capacity as a representative of a bankruptcy
estate, a trustee should not be classified as a natural person because an estate is

184

Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 159 B.R. 890, 905 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (Jellen, J., concurring), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, 67 F.3d 187 (9th Cir. 1995).
185 See Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 175 B.R. 288, 291–92
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994) (holding that the trustee was not entitled to recover damages under § 362(h) because
he was acting as the representative of a corporate entity’s bankruptcy estate), rev’d, 108 F.3d 881 (8th Cir.
1997).
186 See In re Pace, 159 B.R. at 905–06 (Jellen, J., concurring) (discussing the distinction between the
debtor and the representative of the estate).
187 Id. at 906. This point assumes that corporate debtors are not individuals under § 362(k). This Comment
will not address this tangential issue. For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see generally Swarthout,
supra note 99.
188 In re Pace, 159 B.R. at 906 (Jellen, J., concurring).
189 Id. at 905.
190 See id.
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not a natural person.191 Conversely, a bankruptcy estate should not be
considered a natural person even though its representative, the trustee, may be
a natural person in his personal capacity.192
Throughout the Code, Congress uses the term “individual” to refer to the
party-in-interest rather than the representative of the party-in-interest.193 Thus,
according to the rule of statutory construction “that a word is presumed to have
the same meaning in all subsections of the same statute,”194 the term
“individual” in § 362(k) refers to the party seeking relief in an automatic stay
case.
If the availability of relief under the Code depended on the status of the
representative and not the party itself, a party would be eligible for relief under
§ 362(k) as long as the representative of such party was an individual.195 This
result would completely undermine the Code.
For example, estates and trusts196 are ineligible for relief under any chapter
of the Code.197 Section 109(a) provides that “only a person . . . , or a
municipality, may be a debtor under this title,”198 and § 101(41) provides that
“[t]he term ‘person’ includes individual, partnership, and corporation,”199
thereby excluding estates and non-business trusts. The legislative history
shows that Congress explicitly excluded estates and trusts from the definition
of “person.”200 Under the flawed rationale that the status of the estate’s
representative determines eligibility, however, a decedent’s estate would be
eligible to file for bankruptcy if the executor representing the estate happens to

191 Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that any damage is incurred
by a “thing”—the bankruptcy estate—and not by a natural person).
192 In re Pace, 159 B.R. at 906 (Jellen, J., concurring) (“[I]t [is] apparent that the term ‘individual’ was
intended to refer to a natural person injured by a stay relief violation and not to the representative of that
person.”).
193 Id.
194 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 n.2 (1992) (quoting Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir.,
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983)).
195 See In re Pace, 159 B.R. at 906 (Jellen, J., concurring).
196 These are trusts other than business trusts that qualify as corporations under § 101(9).
197 See, e.g., Goerg v. Parungao (In re Goerg), 844 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988) (decedents’ estates
ineligible for relief under the Code); In re BKC Realty Trust, 125 B.R. 65, 68 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (family
trust ineligible for relief).
198 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
199 Id. § 101(41).
200 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 313 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6270 (“The definition [of
‘person’] does not include an estate or a trust, which are included only in the definition of ‘entity’ in proposed
11 U.S.C. [sic] 101(14) [now, § 101(15)].”).
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be an individual. Similarly, “[c]orporations and partnerships would also enjoy
an expanded array of rights (e.g., eligibility to file Chapter 13 and claim
exemptions) in cases where they are represented by a fiduciary who is an
individual.”201
Thus, the status of the trustee as a natural person in his personal capacity
should be of no consequence to determining whether he can recover damages
under § 362(k). Rather, this question turns on whether the bankruptcy estate,
which the trustee represents, should be considered an individual. Because the
bankruptcy estate is not a natural person under § 362(k), the trustee in his
representative capacity is not an individual.
C. Trustee Is Not “Injured” for Purposes of § 362(k)
Regardless of whether a trustee is considered an “individual” under the
statutory analysis set forth in the previous two subparts, a trustee should not be
able to recover damages under § 362(k) because the trustee has not been
“injured” by the violation of the automatic stay as the statute requires.202
Section 362(k) requires that one must be an “individual injured” to recover
damages as set forth under the provision.203 Thus, an individual cannot recover
damages under § 362(k) for a violation of the automatic stay unless that
individual is also injured by the violation.204 Both requirements must be
fulfilled simultaneously. As established in the previous subparts, a trustee is an
individual in his personal capacity and a non-individual in his professional
capacity as a bankruptcy estate’s representative. Thus, in order for a trustee to
be considered an injured individual as required under § 362(k), the trustee
would need to be injured in his personal capacity.
Even if a trustee is an individual under § 362(k), he is not personally
injured by the violation of the automatic stay.205 Rather, the estate that the
201 See Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 159 B.R. 890, 906 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (Jellen, J., concurring),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 67 F.3d 187 (9th Cir. 1995). This case also discusses that, “[b]y the same
construction, trusts and decedents’ estates represented by an individual fiduciary would not only be eligible for
relief under the Bankruptcy Code, they would also qualify to claim exemptions pursuant to section 522(b)(1),
file Chapter 13 cases pursuant to section 109(e), and obtain Chapter 7 discharges pursuant to section 727(a),
rights that are available only to ‘individuals.’” Id.
202 See Martino v. First Nat’l Bank in Harvey (In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc.), 164 B.R. 955, 972
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 186 B.R. 414 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
203 11 U.S.C. § 362(k).
204 See id.
205 See In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, 164 B.R. at 972–73.
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trustee represents is injured. The Ninth Circuit in In re Pace arrived at this very
conclusion.206 The court first established two facts: (1) any resulting damage
was suffered by the bankruptcy estate; and (2) the trustee in his individual
capacity was not a party to the case.207 Because the only party injured in this
case was the estate, the court reasoned that the only way for the trustee to
recover damages under § 362(k) was if the bankruptcy estate was considered
an individual merely because its representative, the trustee, was an individual
in his personal capacity.208 The Ninth Circuit declined to take such an
approach.209
Appellate courts have rejected lower courts’ conclusions that a trustee has
been injured for the purposes of § 362(k).210 One lower court concluded that
the trustee, in following its obligations under § 704(1) to recover property
wrongfully seized by a creditor after the bankruptcy petition had been filed,
likely suffered a loss in not being able to recover attorneys’ fees from the stay
violator.211 In response to this argument, courts have reiterated that the loss of
attorneys’ fees and the like are actually incurred by the bankruptcy estate,
which is an entity, not an individual.212 Courts have also held that the time
required of the trustee to file a motion in an automatic stay case is not a type of
damage intended to be remedied by § 362(k).213
The conclusion that the trustee is not injured by a stay violation is
consistent with the distinction between an injured party and that party’s
representative that courts have made in other areas of law. For example,
according to an interpretation of Internal Revenue Code § 104(a)(2),
beneficiaries that receive funds on account of another individual’s personal
injuries are not eligible to exclude this income because they have not been

206

Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 192–93.
208 See id.
209 Id. at 193.
210 See, e.g., id.
211 Martino v. First Nat’l Bank of Harvey (In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc.), 186 B.R. 414, 439 (N.D.
Ill. 1995).
212 In re Pace, 67 F.3d at 193 (asserting that, while In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods allows a trustee to fit the
definition of “individual,” loss in form of attorneys’ fees and costs “is actually incurred by a thing, viz., the
bankruptcy estate, and not by the trustee as a natural person”). Regardless of whether the harm is incurred by
the trustee as a representative of an estate or as an individual, recovering under § 362(k) is not necessary to
rectify any loss incurred because attorneys’ fees are an available form of relief under § 105. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a) (2006).
213 Lovett v. Honeywell, Inc., 930 F.2d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1991).
207
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personally injured.214 Similar to how a beneficiary represents an injured party
in receiving the damages, the trustee represents the debtor in an automatic stay
case. Thus, the trustee is not an injured party, but a representative of the actual
injured party, the estate.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF PRECLUDING TRUSTEES FROM RECOVERING UNDER
§ 362(K)—THE AVAILABILITY AND APPROPRIATENESS OF DAMAGES
At first glance, it may seem that trustees should be treated as “individuals”
under § 362(k) to avoid a scenario in which creditors can violate the stay with
impunity “as long as those injured by the violation happen to be entities other
than natural persons.”215 The argument follows that, if creditors are able to go
unpunished in this circumstance, it undercuts the purposes of the automatic
stay216 to provide a “breathing spell” for debtors and to ensure that creditors
are paid in an equitable manner.217 Thus, the argument continues, the
bankruptcy system requires a more lenient standard for defining “individual”
under § 362(k) to impose more damages on violators of the automatic stay218
and avoid an outcome in which creditors go unpunished and undeterred.
Indeed, many of the courts holding that trustees and other entities should be
considered individuals have rationalized that preventing them from recovering
damages under § 362(k) would be contrary to congressional intent.219 For
example, the Fourth Circuit in Better Homes of Virginia held that a corporation
can recover damages for an automatic stay violation under § 362(h) (now
§ 362(k)) because “it seems unlikely that Congress meant to give a remedy
only to individual debtors” and “[s]uch a narrow construction of the term

214 Peoples Fin. & Thrift Co. v. Comm’r, 184 F.2d 836, 837 (5th Cir. 1950); see also Estate of Wesson v.
United States, 843 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (“[T]he beneficiaries cannot seriously contend that
they received the punitive-damages award ‘on account of personal injuries’ as required under section 104(a)(2)
for purposes of exclusion from taxation.”), aff’d sub nom. Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894 (5th Cir.
1995).
215 See Howe, supra note 182, at 1955.
216 See D. Casey Kobi, Note, Staying True to Purpose: Including Corporate Debtors Under § 362(h) of
the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 76 IND. L.J. 243, 267 (2001) (“The purpose of § 362(h) will be destroyed if
creditors can violate the automatic stay without suffering repercussions under the Bankruptcy Code.”).
217 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97.
218 See Howe, supra note 182, at 1954–55.
219 See, e.g., Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986); Martino v.
First Nat’l Bank of Harvey (In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc.), 186 B.R. 414, 438–39 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
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would defeat much of the purpose of the section.”220 The Fourth Circuit is one
of only two circuit courts to hold that a non-natural person is an individual.221
The decision in Better Homes of Virginia and other similar conclusions are
based on the false assumption that, if a party is unable to recover under
§ 362(k), the party will be unable to recover any type of damages based on a
violation of the automatic stay.222 On the contrary, if a trustee is unable to
recover under § 362(k), that trustee is still entitled to recover damages under
§ 105’s contempt provision.223 Section 105 provides trustees with an adequate
recovery, enabling them to receive both compensatory damages and attorneys’
fees.224 Indeed, punitive damages are the only form of damages available under
§ 362(k) that are not available under § 105.
The fact that punitive damages are not available as a remedy for contempt
under § 105, however, provides no basis for concluding that a trustee should be
able to proceed under § 362(k). Awarding punitive damages to a trustee is
inappropriate because doing so does not further the main policies behind
punitive damages, which are to deter violations of the stay and to punish
violators.
A. Recovery Under § 105 Is Available and Adequate
Many courts have held that, because an automatic stay constitutes a court
order, a violation of the stay is punishable as contempt of court.225 Thus, if a
trustee is not eligible to recover damages under § 362(k), then the trustee may

220

Better Homes of Va., 804 F.2d at 292.
The only other circuit to hold that a non-natural person is an individual is the Third Circuit. See Cuffee
v. Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990) (corporate
debtor). The Second Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit have held that non-natural persons, specifically
trustees or corporations, are not individuals under § 362(k). See Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co.
(In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186–87 (2d Cir. 1990) (corporate debtor); Sosne v. Reinert & Duree,
P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1997) (corporate debtor is not an
individual); Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996)
(trustee is not an individual); Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1995) (trustee is not
an individual); Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 1993) (corporate
debtor is not an individual). The First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit Courts have not
ruled on this issue yet.
222 See Better Homes of Va., 804 F.2d at 292.
223 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[2].
224 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
225 See, e.g., Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1996); In re
Xavier’s of Beville, Inc., 172 B.R. 667, 671–72 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); Fry v. Today’s Homes, Inc. (In re
Fry), 122 B.R. 427, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).
221
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still recover damages under § 105.226 Section 105 grants courts the power to
award compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees for automatic stay violations
to the extent that such awards are “necessary or appropriate” to carry out the
provisions of the Code.227
The fact that the contempt remedy was used for decades to enforce the
automatic stay suggests that it is an adequate remedy for trustees and other
non-individuals who are not eligible to recover damages under § 362(k).
Before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act in 1984, which permitted individuals to recover under § 362(h) (now
§ 362(k)),228 recovery under § 105 was the only means for enforcing the
automatic stay.229
Considering that damages for a violation of the stay were available under
§ 105 for some time, Congress likely passed § 362(h) to offer a unique,
perhaps narrower, form of recovery.230 The legislative history of § 362(h)
states that § 362(h) was enacted to offer “an additional right of individual
debtors, and [was] not intended to foreclose recovery under already existing
remedies.”231 Several courts, citing the legislative history, have interpreted
Congress’s intent for § 362(h) to supplement, rather than replace, the contempt
remedy available under § 105.232

226

See In re Pace, 67 F.3d at 193; cf. Spookyworld, Inc. v. Town of Berlin (In re Spookyworld, Inc.), 346
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Arkison (In re Cascade Rds., Inc.), 34 F.3d 756, 767 (9th Cir. 1994);
In re Goodman, 991 F.2d at 620 (9th Cir. 1993) (corporation can seek damages under contempt theory); In re
Chateaugay Corp., 920 F.2d at 186. But see In re Daniels, 206 B.R. 444, 446–47 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997)
(holding that it is improper for an individual to seek relief via a motion for contempt, and that sanctions should
be pursued through § 362(k)).
227 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
228 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 304, 98 Stat.
333, 352.
229 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[2]. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a creditor would be held in
contempt for willfully violating the Bankruptcy Rules if he knew that the debtor had filed for bankruptcy and
still brought an action against the debtor without first securing the bankruptcy court’s permission. Fid. Mortg.
Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc. (In re Fid. Mortg. Investors), 550 F.2d 47, 51–52 (2d Cir. 1976).
230 See COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[3].
231 See 130 CONG. REC. 6,504 (1984) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (emphasis added).
232 See, e.g., Wagner v. Ivory (In re Wagner), 74 B.R. 898, 903 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); Aponte v. Aungst
(In re Aponte), 82 B.R. 738, 742 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Colon v. Hart (In re Colon), 114 B.R. 890, 898
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (“Congress intended, prior to the enactment of § 362(h), that enforcement of the
automatic stay could be by civil contempt. The passage of section 362(h) was not intended to preclude the use
of civil contempt.” (citation omitted)), appeal dismissed sub nom. Szostek v. Hart, 123 B.R. 719 (E.D. Pa.
1991), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom. Colon v. Hart (In re Colon), 941 F.2d 242 (3d Cir.
1991).

GOULD GALLEYS3

498

6/27/2013 2:17 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

Because § 105 does not offer any remedy that is not also available under
§ 362(k),233 making § 362(k) available to all types of debtors (including those
that are not individuals) would render § 105 superfluous.234 The Supreme
Court has ruled, however, that statutes should be read so as to avoid
superfluity.235 Thus, the only logical conclusion is that Congress intended for
§ 105 to continue providing relief for those who cannot seek recourse under
§ 362(k).
While the standards and types of recovery are slightly different for § 362(k)
and § 105,236 recovery under § 105 is sufficient for non-individuals.237 As a
leading bankruptcy treatise concludes, “although the standards and procedures
for contempt may be slightly more demanding, courts have had little difficulty
dealing with and punishing stay violations even without the availability of
section 362(k).”238
Several courts have allowed trustees to recover under § 362(k) based on the
availability of attorneys’ fees under this section.239 The trustee is obligated to
recover property for the benefit of the estate and may incur large attorneys’
fees if litigation is required to address a stay violation that removed property
from the estate.240 Courts have reasoned that, “[i]f the trustee incurs legal
expenses in recovering such property and cannot recover his fees from the
party that violated the stay, either the estate will be depleted by the amount of
the trustee’s costs of recovery or the trustee will not be reimbursed for those
costs.”241
But a trustee does not have to proceed under § 362(k) to recover attorneys’
fees. Courts have consistently ruled that attorneys’ fees are recoverable as a

233 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006) (offering compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and punitive
damages), with id. § 105(a) (offering only compensatory damages and, in some cases, attorney’s fees).
234 Conversely, some courts have held that a finding of civil contempt is not a prerequisite to the
imposition of sanctions under § 362(h). See Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 293
(4th Cir. 1986).
235 See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2474 (2010) (“[W]e are hesitant to adopt an interpretation
of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.” (quoting
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
236 See supra text accompanying notes 85–94.
237 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[3] & n.39.
238 Id. ¶ 362.12.
239 Martino v. First Nat’l Bank of Harvey (In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc.), 186 B.R. 414, 439 (N.D.
Ill. 1995).
240 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2006).
241 In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, 186 B.R. at 439.
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part of a contempt remedy under § 105.242 Because § 105 allows for the
recovery of attorneys’ fees, the estate will not be depleted if the trustee must
pursue a proceeding for a violation of the automatic stay to recover property of
the estate.243
B. Trustee’s Recovery of Punitive Damages Is Inappropriate
Notwithstanding the differences between § 105 and § 362(k) discussed in
the previous subpart, the main practical difference between the remedies under
these two provisions is that punitive damages are available under § 362(k),
whereas they are not available under § 105.244 Thus, imperative to any
discussion on why a trustee should not be considered an individual under
§ 362(k) is an analysis of why trustees should not recover punitive damages for
a violation of the automatic stay.
Because awarding punitive damages is controversial,245 courts should
administer them thoughtfully, taking special care to examine the policy
rationale for punitive damages and how the awarding of punitive damages for
automatic stay violations would further these policies.246
At least seven purposes for awarding punitive damages have been
advanced, which include the following: “(1) punishing the defendant; (2)
deterring the defendant from repeating the offense; (3) deterring others from
committing an offense; (4) preserving the peace; (5) inducing private law
enforcement; (6) compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable losses;
and (7) paying the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees.”247 The Supreme Court, however,
has recently stated that awarding punitive damages is “aimed . . . principally at
242

See Surette, supra note 40, § 6[a] (listing cases in which attorney’s fees have been awarded).
Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1995) (“It is clear that, even though a
trustee does not qualify as an ‘individual’ for purposes of section 362(h), a trustee can recover damages in the
form of costs and attorney’s fees under section 105(a) as a sanction for ordinary civil contempt.” (emphasis
added)).
244 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1), with Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th
Cir. 2003).
245 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV.
869, 870 (1998); see Steve P. Calandrillo, Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why the Supreme Court Needs a
Lesson in Law and Economics, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 781–93 (2010) (surveying modern Supreme Court
case law to illustrate how punitive damages have evolved and been limited over the years). In fact, some
scholars have gone so far as to argue that punitive damages have no deterrent or punitive effect. See generally
W. Kip Viscusi, Why There is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 381 (1998).
246 See generally Calandrillo, supra note 245.
247 See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 3 (1982).
243
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retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”248 Similarly, bankruptcy courts
have repeatedly stated that the purposes of awarding punitive damages for a
violation of an automatic stay are to deter future violations and to punish
violators.249
Although the goals of punitive damages are clear, the methods of assessing
punitive damages to enforce these goals are notoriously inconsistent.250
Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence has espoused numerous tests and rules
to solve the unpredictable and arbitrary nature of punitive judgments, yet the
Court still employs a largely subjective approach that does not directly address
the key question: what amount of damages is optimal to incentivize potential
violators of the law (e.g., the automatic stay) to make socially optimal
choices?251
The law-and-economics theory of assessing and administering punitive
damages may answer this question. This theory aims to determine
systematically the appropriate levels of deterrence and punishment in society
to maximize social welfare.252 A consistent approach is especially important to
maintain a predictable and stable bankruptcy system that businesses,
consumers, and attorneys can rely on when making financial decisions.253
This Comment discusses the two main policy reasons for awarding punitive
damages for automatic stay violations—deterrence and retribution—and uses a
law-and-economics approach to argue that awarding punitive damages to
trustees does not further these policies. Consequently, the remedies available
under § 362(k) should be reserved solely for debtors who are natural persons.
1. Administering Punitive Damages to Deter Future Violations
Deterrence is one of the main purposes of awarding punitive damages in
general254 and, in bankruptcy cases, for violations of the automatic stay.255 The
248

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008).
See, e.g., Frankel v. Strayer (In re Frankel), 391 B.R. 266, 275 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); In re M & J
Feed Mill, Inc., 112 B.R. 985, 990 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990); Mercer v. D.E.F., Inc. (In re Mercer), 48 B.R.
562, 565 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). The Supreme Court has also explained that punitive damages are for the
purposes of deterrence and punishment. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432
(2001); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
250 See Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 818–19.
251 See id.
252 Id. at 793.
253 Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 41, at 177–78.
254 See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
249
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theory behind deterrence is that “a potential wrongdoer [will] refrain[] from
engaging in prohibited conduct because he or she perceives and fears the threat
of legal punishment.”256
In theory, awarding punitive damages furthers both specific deterrence and
general deterrence. In the context of automatic stay violations, specific
deterrence refers to the deterrence of a specific creditor from violating the
automatic stay in the future.257 General deterrence, on the other hand, refers to
the deterrence of all creditors from violating the stay.258
According to traditional justifications for imposing punitive damages,
punitive damages are necessary for deterrence when compensatory damages
alone are unlikely to have a sufficient deterrent effect either because (1) the
wrongdoers are extremely likely to escape liability; or (2) compensatory
damages are systematically too low.259 Trustees should not be able to recover
punitive damages under the deterrence rationale because neither of these two
circumstances applies to cases brought by trustees. Each of these two
circumstances will be examined in turn below.
a. High Likelihood of Escaping Liability
According to economic theory, punitive damages intended to deter
unwanted behavior should be awarded “if, and only if, an injurer has a
significant chance of escaping liability for the harm he causes.”260 Conversely,

255 See Quiñones Lopez v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Quiñones Lopez), 319 B.R. 58, 60 (Bankr.
D.P.R. 2004).
256 Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for
Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 111–12 (2002). The degree to which punitive damages actually deter
undesirable behavior is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of psychological factors that may
influence the deterrent effects of tort law, see generally Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in
Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115 (1993).
257 Galmore v. Dykstra (In re Galmore), 390 B.R. 901, 908 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008) (“An award of
punitive damages [for violation of the automatic stay] is part a deterrent, i.e., to cause a change in the
creditor’s behavior, and in this context the prospect of such change is relevant to the amount of punitive
damages to be awarded.”); In re Pawlowicz, 337 B.R. 640, 648 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (explaining that “the
primary purpose of an award of punitive damages becomes that which is sufficient to cause a change in the
creditor’s behavior”).
258 See Frankel v. Strayer (In re Frankel), 391 B.R. 266, 275 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008) (explaining that the
purpose of the automatic stay is to deter the creditor and others like him from violating the automatic stay).
259 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 873–75.
260 Id. at 874 (emphasis removed).
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punitive damages are inappropriate when the probability of detection is
medium or high.261
An injurer typically escapes liability for harms for which it should be liable
in one of three circumstances: (1) the victim has difficulty determining that the
harm was the result of another party’s unlawful conduct;262 (2) even if the
victim knows that another wrongfully injured him, the victim has difficulty
proving who specifically caused the harm;263 and (3) even if the victim knows
that he was wrongfully injured and the party who injured him, the victim may
decide to not sue the injurer.264 This third situation often arises when “the
magnitude of the damage is small enough that it is not worth the victim’s time
or expense to litigate.”265
Punitive damages are inappropriate for trustees because violators of the
automatic stay are less likely to escape liability for violating the stay when a
trustee brings the suit on behalf of the estate than when a debtor brings the
suit.266 The three circumstances in which an injurer often evades liability
discussed above do not apply to cases brought by trustees for several reasons.
First, a trustee would not have difficulty determining that a violation of the
stay is an action that gives rise to a legal wrong.267 Because trustees are usually
bankruptcy lawyers or accountants appointed by the U.S. trustee based on their
knowledge of bankruptcy proceedings, they are likely to be very familiar with
the kind of conduct that constitutes a violation of the stay.268 On the other
hand, debtors generally have little or no experience with bankruptcy

261

See id. at 895–96.
Id. at 888; see also Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 800 (2010) (discussing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563 (1996), and concluding that punitive damages are appropriate because the company
was unlikely to be sued by the victims who were unlikely to notice the wear and tear on their cars).
263 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 888.
264 Id.
265 Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 800; see Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676–77
(7th Cir. 2003) (arguing that substantial punitive damages were necessary for adequate deterrence because the
harmed individuals suffered only minor injuries and so would rationally choose not to sue and bear the costs of
litigation).
266 See supra text accompanying note 179.
267 See Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186 n.1
(2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy
Co.), 902 F.2d 1098, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990)).
268 Cf. In re Abacus Broad. Corp., 150 B.R. 925, 928 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993). Congress may have
viewed trustees and other entities, such as corporations, as “more likely to already know their rights under the
bankruptcy law” because they are repeat players in the system. Id.; see also In re Chateaugay Corp., 920 F.2d
at 186.
262
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proceedings and may not realize that a creditor’s conduct constitutes a
violation.269 While an individual debtor can hire a bankruptcy lawyer to guide
him during the proceeding, he may not know that the violation is one that
merits hiring an attorney in the first place.270
Second, if there have been some violation of the stay and subsequent harm
to the estate, the trustee would have no trouble determining which creditor is
responsible because he has a professional responsibility to keep track of who
the creditors are and what the respective debts owed to each of them are.271
Third, a trustee is more likely to sue a violating creditor because the estate,
rather than the trustee himself, is bearing the cost of litigation.272 Also, a
trustee has the duty to administer and protect the property of the estate.273
Debtors, however, are less likely to file a lawsuit and incur additional
attorneys’ fees, which would deepen their existing debt.
When the probability of detection is high, as it is in the case of a trustee
representing the estate for a violation of an automatic stay, the damages
awarded should equal the amount necessary to fully compensate for the harm
caused.274 In other words, any award of damages should only be compensatory
and should not include punitive damages.275 Awarding punitive damages in
circumstances in which the probability of detection is high would result in
“overdeterrence,” thus leading to “decreased productivity, increased cost,
decreased consumption, and a decline in overall social welfare.”276
If courts excessively apply punitive damages by awarding them to trustees
in stay violation cases, then violating creditors would go to great lengths in the

269 See In re Abacus Broad. Corp., 150 B.R. at 928 (“Congress may have viewed natural persons as
particularly vulnerable to violations of the automatic stay” and drafted § 362(k) to provide a “precise, easily
applied, private cause of action to vindicate [their] rights, consistent with the consumer protection goals of the
statute.”).
270 See id.; see also Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 800; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 888.
271 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(2) (2006) (detailing a trustee’s duties to maintain comprehensive records of the
property of the estate); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2015.
272 See COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 323.03. Attorneys’ fees are not always awarded. See, e.g., Thornburg v.
Lynch (In re Thornburg), 277 B.R. 719, 731 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2002); Chase Lumber & Fuel Co. v. Koch (In
re Koch), 197 B.R. 654, 660 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996).
273 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a).
274 See Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 799; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 890.
275 “Specifically, punitive damages should equal the harm multiplied by . . . the ratio of the injurer’s
chance of escaping liability to his chance of being found liable.” Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 890.
276 Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 799.
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future to avoid paying those damages.277 For example, the creditor may choose
to stop collecting debts that it is legally entitled to collect or to incur the
expense of retaining lawyers to counsel it on collecting unpaid debts after a
debtor has filed for bankruptcy. These actions would result in lost profits or
increased costs for the creditor, which may cause the creditor to increase its
interest rates on future loans.
Alternatively, a deep-pocket creditor may hire judgment-proof independent
contractors to engage in the behavior that violates the automatic stay to avoid
the risk of punitive damages.278 These independent contractors are often
undercapitalized and thus do not need to worry that their collection habits
could expose them to liability.279
b. Systematically Low Compensatory Damages
Similar to the effect of having a high likelihood that a creditor will escape
liability for a violation, if the damages awarded for certain automatic stay
violations are systematically too low, such compensatory damages will not
adequately deter creditors from violating the stay. In these cases, punitive
damages are necessary to adequately deter unwanted behavior.280
Compensatory damages are consistently too low when creditors seize a
debtor’s personal property but the court does not award damages for emotional
distress.281 Individual debtors, rather than trustees, usually bring cases in which
the compensatory damages would be too low for adequate deterrence because
trustees have little incentive to pursue recourse for violations of the stay that do
not involve valuable property. The property at issue in these cases is often that
which would not be valuable to the estate and thus to the trustee.282
For example, in a case in which a creditor violated the automatic stay by
taking possession of the debtor’s vehicle, the court held that there was
insufficient evidence to award compensatory damages for vehicle expenses and

277
278
279
280
281
282

See id. at 802–03 (2010).
See id. at 803.
See id.
See Ellis Jr., supra note 247, at 26–31.
See, e.g., Bank of Bos. v. Baker (In re Baker), 140 B.R. 88, 89–90 (D. Vt. 1992).
6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.02[1].
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no basis for awarding damages for emotional distress.283 If the amount of
damages were based solely on compensatory damages, the creditor would not
have been required to pay anything for the violation. For this reason, the court
awarded the debtor attorneys’ fees and $10,000 in punitive damages for the
bank’s misconduct.284
Furthermore, it is more important to deter violations of the stay that would
result in a debtor taking action against the violating creditor, such as the
wrongful repossession of exempted property, than violations that would result
in the trustee taking action. The practice of awarding punitive damages for a
violation of the automatic stay may deter would-be violators by encouraging
these creditors to obtain relief from the stay or a determination that the stay
does not preclude the creditors from exercising their interests in the debtor’s
property.285 A creditor’s decision to seek such relief before repossessing the
property is especially important when the property at stake is vital to the
debtor’s livelihood or survival—such as the car the debtor uses to get to work
or the bank account the debtor uses to buy daily groceries. The debtor is
unlikely able to afford to lose such property for even a short amount of time. In
contrast, the wrongful repossession of property belonging to the estate would
not have the same negative effects, as a trustee is likely able to spend the time
required to pursue the property without causing negative repercussions to the
estate.
2. Administering Punitive Damages to Punish Offenders
Another purpose of punitive damages is to punish violators of the
automatic stay.286 While awarding punitive damages for the purpose of
deterrence is forward-looking and focuses on the consequences of the
punishment, awarding punitive damages for retribution focuses on restoring
the moral equilibrium after a wrongdoer has injured another party.287 Such

283 In re Baker, 140 B.R. at 89–90 (“Although the Bankruptcy Court indicated that other people may have
been inconvenienced by debtor’s lack of an automobile, there was no evidence as to a rental car, or payment of
expenses to people who transported debtor.”).
284 Id.
285 Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 902 F.2d
1098, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990).
286 See, e.g., Frankel v. Strayer (In re Frankel), 391 B.R. 266, 275 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); In re M & J
Feed Mill, Inc., 112 B.R. 985, 990 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990); Mercer v. D.E.F., Inc. (In re Mercer), 48 B.R.
562, 565 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
287 See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 1393, 1432–33 (1993).
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retributive punishment is a way to communicate to the offender that his
behavior is prohibited.288
According to legal scholar Jean Hampton’s theory of retributivism, when a
wrongdoer harms another individual, it is the expression of a false view that
such wrongdoer is of elevated value compared to the injured party.289 By
committing the wrong, “the wrongdoer has implicitly asserted a kind of
undeserved mastery and superiority over the victim.”290 Hampton’s theory
provides that “[t]he purpose of punishment is to reassert the truth about the
relative value of wrongdoer and victim by inflicting a publicly visible defeat
on the wrongdoer.”291 Compensatory damages are sometimes insufficient to
restore the disrupted moral equilibrium because they are based on the
wrongdoer’s deserved loss, which is determined only by the injured party’s
undeserved loss.292
The bankruptcy system follows the same general rationale by using
punitive damages to impose “appropriate sanctions on blameworthy parties.”293
In this context, blameworthiness is equated with “the reprehensibility of a
party’s conduct,” “[the conduct’s] maliciousness,” or “the extent to which [the
conduct] reflects disregard for the well-being of others.”294
Awarding punitive damages based on blameworthiness requires some
analysis of the morality of the conduct, which is subjective and problematic
when assessing the amount of damages to be awarded. In calculating punitive
damages using a retribution rationale, however, courts have considered the
following factors:
whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the
tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of
the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial
vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an

288 Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 239, 242 (2009).
289 Galanter & Luban, supra note 287, at 1432–34.
290 Id. at 1432.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 1433.
293 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 948.
294 Id.
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isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice,
295
trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.

Bankruptcy courts have similarly identified several factors to be considered
when awarding punitive damages for a violation of the automatic stay,
including “the nature of the creditor’s conduct, the nature and extent of harm to
the debtor, . . . [and] the creditor’s motives.”296
The most important factor courts must consider is the reprehensibility of
the creditor’s conduct.297 In assessing the reprehensibility of the violator’s
conduct, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between acts that inflict
“purely economic” harm and instances that show a “reckless disregard for the
health and safety of others,” implying that the latter should be subject to higher
punitive damages.298 Similarly, one court explained that automobile
repossessions, personal property, home foreclosures, and instances where
bodily harm is threatened are the most serious violations.299
Thus, a violation of an automatic stay is likely to be considered most
reprehensible if it affects the individual debtor himself and not just the
property belonging to the estate. The debtor, rather than the trustee, is usually
the party to pursue a case involving physical harm to the debtor himself or a
case involving the repossession of personal property because these items are
most likely to be exempted from the estate.300 Trustees have a stake in
pursuing a violation of a stay when the property involved is one of the key
assets the trustee is trying to liquidate—that is, when the property is valuable
and has not been exempted.301 When an individual debtor pursues an

295 See Markel, supra note 288, at 251 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408, 419 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
296 Galmore v. Dykstra (In re Galmore), 390 B.R. 901, 908 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008). Courts have also
mentioned a creditor’s ability to pay damages, the level of a creditor’s sophistication, and any provocation by
the debtor as factors to be considered. See, e.g., id. However, these factors are less relevant to assessing
punitive damages for retributive reasons and will not be examined in this Comment.
297 Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 (requiring a court to examine “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct” because it was “[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award”).
298 Id. at 576.
299 Varela v. Ocasio (In re Ocasio), 272 B.R. 815, 826 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002); accord Progressive Motors,
Inc. v. Frazier, 220 B.R. 476, 477–78 (D. Utah 1998) (repossession of a car); Bishop v. U.S. Bank/Firstar
Bank, N.A. (In re Bishop), 296 B.R. 890, 898–99 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003) (repossession of a truck).
300 See, e.g., Frazier, 220 B.R. at 477 (repossession of a car); In re Bishop, 296 B.R. at 892–94
(repossession of a truck).
301 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2006) (explaining that, in a chapter 7 case, the role of the trustee is to
liquidate the debtor’s assets and distribute the proceeds to creditors in an expeditious manner).
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adjudication of a stay violation, there are usually more than just financial
interests at stake. Thus, a trustee does not have a compelling argument to assert
a retributive rationale for punitive damages because the trustee does not have a
personal stake in the matter.
3. A Note on Awarding Punitive Damages to Serve a Compensatory
Purpose
Although some commentators have argued that punitive damages should
not be awarded to correct for inadequate compensatory damages,302 punitive
damages awarded in the circumstances described above are not to compensate
the victim, but to either deter or punish the offender. Punitive damages,
however, have a long history of being awarded to supplement compensatory
damages for intangible wrongs.303 But, “as the scope of compensatory damages
expanded to include intangible harms including hurt feelings and indignities in
recent years, . . . the need to use punitive damages to compensate such harms
may have diminished.”304
Because punitive damages are awarded in reaction to a creditor’s conduct
and not the plaintiff’s loss, it may seem irrelevant whether the plaintiff is a
debtor or a trustee. The Supreme Court, however, has suggested that, while
punitive damages are not compensatory, the plaintiff’s status is relevant to an
assessment of punitive damages.305 “Moreover, notwithstanding the public
nature of the retributive and deterrent functions the Court associates with extracompensatory damages, only a small number of states have adopted split
recovery schemes through which the state shares in the pre-tax award of
punitive damages.”306 “Consequently, in most states, if a court awards
[punitive] damages, the plaintiff [(either the debtor or the debtor’s estate via
the trustee)] will receive most, if not all, of [the award].”307 Thus, whether
these damages are designed as compensatory, the fact that the plaintiff is the

302 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 942; see Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the
Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 139–40 (1982).
303 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 491–92 (2008); Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 781
(listing “the essential functions of punitive damages: punishment, deterrence, and supplemental
compensation”).
304 Markel, supra note 288, at 249.
305 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576–77 (1996) (listing the debtor’s financial vulnerability as a factor for
determining the defendant’s degree of reprehensibility).
306 Markel, supra note 288, at 250.
307 Id.
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party benefiting from the punitive damages suggests that there is, at least
practically, a compensatory element to these damages that warrants further
consideration.
Requiring a creditor to pay punitive damages in a proceeding brought by an
individual debtor makes intuitive sense. The debtor himself was wronged by
the stay violation, and there is a sense that he deserves this extra compensation.
But, requiring a creditor to pay punitive damages when the trustee asserts a
stay violation produces a more absurd result. The punitive damages are
awarded to the estate, which is then distributed to creditors. Thus, the creditors,
including the one that violated the automatic stay resulting in the payment of
punitive damages, reap the reward for the violation, albeit in an indirect way.
This result is not likely what Congress intended when it enacted § 362(k).
IV. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER BANKRUPTCY PLAYERS
A determination of whether a trustee is considered an individual under
§ 362(k) affects not only chapter 7 trustees, but also others who have standing
to seek a remedy for a violation of the stay, including chapter 11 trustees,
corporations, and other entities that are neither debtors nor pre-petition
creditors.308 For this reason, should Congress choose to amend § 362(k) to
specifically exclude trustees, it should be careful to construct a narrowly
tailored provision that would not unintentionally exclude such parties.
First, if a trustee is not considered an individual under § 362(k), a violating
creditor can argue that a chapter 11 debtor in possession, like a trustee, is not
an individual under § 362(k). Section 1107(a) states that “a debtor in
possession shall have all the rights . . . and powers, and shall perform all the
functions and duties, . . . of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.”309
Furthermore, in § 1107(a)’s legislative history, Congress stated that § 1107(a)
“places a debtor in possession in the shoes of a trustee in every way” and he is
“subject to any limitations on a chapter 11 trustee.”310 Because a debtor in
possession in chapter 11 has all the rights and is subject to all the limitations of
an ordinary trustee, if a trustee is not considered an individual under § 362(k),
then a violating creditor could argue that a chapter 11 debtor in possession may
308 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Alside Supply Ctr. of Knoxville (In re Clemmer), 178 B.R. 160, 162–63
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995); In re Prairie Trunk Ry., 112 B.R. 924, 929–31 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990). See
generally Surette, supra note 40.
309 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006).
310 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 116 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5902.
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not be considered an individual either. However, this argument is weak, as it
would likely be considered to go against Congress’s intention.
Second, courts have considered the issue of whether a corporation is an
individual under § 362(k) as analogous to the issue of whether a trustee is an
individual.311 If the plain meaning of “individual” in § 362(k) includes only
natural persons, a corporation may not be considered an individual under the
statute because a corporation also is not a natural person.312 Whether a
corporation should be eligible to recover under § 362(k) is outside the scope of
this Comment. However, in contrast to the case of trustees, it may be easier to
argue that punitive damages are necessary to deter and punish stay violations
against corporations.313 With respect to the issue of whether creditors’
violations would go undetected, corporations are more analogous to individual
debtors than trustees. For instance, like individual debtors, corporations,
especially closely held corporations, are often not as educated in bankruptcy as
trustees are, and they have a more personal interest in the property than
trustees do.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted § 362(k) to offer specific statutory protection for
individual debtors victimized by a creditor’s violation of the automatic stay. It
presumably recognized the importance of protecting vulnerable individual
debtors unfamiliar with bankruptcy law314 and thus limited the recovery under
§ 362(k) to “individuals injured” by an automatic stay violation.315 Trustees do
not require a similar level of protection under the Code and do not need
§ 362(k) to recover damages, specifically punitive damages.
Since the enactment of § 362(k) in 1984, courts have repeatedly disagreed
on whether the term “individual” encompasses only individual debtors or also

311 See, e.g., Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 184–
87 (2d Cir. 1990). See generally Swarthout, supra note 99.
312 In re Chateaugay Corp., 920 F.2d at 184–85. See generally Swarthout, supra note 99.
313 See Cuffee v. Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d
Cir. 1990); Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986).
314 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97 (“The automatic
stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a
breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions.”).
315 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2006).
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includes trustees.316 Although a circuit split on this issue has existed for the
past decade and new case law is continually added to this split,317 there is still
very little Supreme Court or congressional guidance on how to address this
issue.
Most courts have focused primarily on the plain meaning of the term
“individual” to resolve this question.318 An analysis of the statute’s language in
accordance with Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that the plain meaning
of “individual” under § 362(k) only includes natural persons. Because trustees
are representatives of a bankruptcy estate—an entity—they should not be
considered natural persons for the purposes of § 362(k). Furthermore, trustees
are not injured by the violation of the automatic stay, as the statute requires.
Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to solely rely on plain meaning to resolve
the question of whether a trustee is an individual under § 362(k). The rules for
determining plain meaning espoused by the Supreme Court produce results
that are unreliable, arbitrary, and in some cases, contradictory.319 And, the fact
that courts have disagreed on the plain meaning of “individual” for the past
thirty-five years suggests that the statute is ambiguous.
The conclusion that the plain meaning of § 362(k) indicates that the term
“individual” is meant to apply to only natural persons, and not to trustees, is
consistent with the statute’s purpose to protect individual consumers.
Furthermore, such a conclusion adheres to the goals behind the assessment of
punitive damages—to deter violations of the stay and to punish violators.
Appropriately, punitive damages are the only form of damages the trustee
would not have access to if he were forced to rely on § 105 instead of § 362(k).

316 Compare Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1995) (trustee is not an
individual), In re Chateaugay Corp., 920 F.2d at 184–85 (corporate debtor is not an individual), and Sosne v.
Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d 881, 884–85 (8th Cir. 1997)
(corporate debtor is not an individual), with In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp., 901 F.2d at 329 (corporate debtor is
an individual).
317 See, e.g., Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1189 (9th Cir. 2003); Barstow v.
Ingaldson Maasen & Fitzgerald (In re Avery), Ch. 7 Case No. A06-00455-DMD, Adv. No. 85-1190, 2011 WL
5330789, at *3 (Bankr. D. Alaska Nov. 4, 2011); In re Sayeh, 445 B.R. 19, 27 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011); Gecker
v. Gierczyk (In re Glenn), 379 B.R. 760, 762–63 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007).
318 See In re Pace, 67 F.3d at 193.
319 See, e.g., Bussel, supra note 150, at 897; Kelch, supra note 148, at 301–09; Klee & Merola, supra note
148, at 1–2; Lawless, supra note 148, at 109–10; Markell, supra note 148, at 181–82; Tabb & Lawless, supra
note 148, at 879–85; Tabb, supra note 148, at 570–75.
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Several courts have reasoned that, plain meaning and congressional intent
aside, an interpretation of § 362(k) that precludes trustees, and perhaps other
major players in the bankruptcy system, from recovering under the statute
would be contrary to the broad purpose of the automatic stay.320 According to
the Supreme Court, however, “the sole function of the courts is to enforce [a
statute] according to its terms,” not to attempt to improve enacted legislation as
the courts see fit.321 As the Third Circuit stated in In re Chateaugay Corp.,
“even if we thought § 362(h) [(now § 362(k))] would better serve the code’s
purposes by being applied to all debtors, we could do no more than invite
Congress to change the result.”322
Until Congress acts, the courts should enforce § 362(k) in a way that makes
both interpretive and intuitive sense and preclude trustees from recovering
punitive damages for a violation of the automatic stay.
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